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The	research	reported	here	is	an	investigation	of	instruction	and	assessment	in	
architectural	education.	The	 focus	 is	on	 the	practice	of	 critique,	 an	educational	
activity	in	which	instructors	and	professional	architects	give	students	 feedback	
on	their	finished	projects.	Taking	an	ethnomethodologically	informed	approach,	
the	interests	of	the	thesis	revolve	around	questions	of	how	critique	is	done	as	an	
occasioned	instructional	practice.	The	empirical	material	consists	of	video	record-
ings	of	critique	sessions	at	a	Swedish	school	of	architecture.	The	core	of	the	thesis	
consists	of	four	empirical	studies.	Study	1	deals	with	issues	of	professional	vision	
and	the	ways	in	which	the	graphical	surface	of	the	presentation	is	seen.	Study	2	
addresses	the	significance	of	intentions	in	the	setting.	The	study	examines	how	the	
relation	between	students’	stated	intentions	and	the	presented	designs	is	treated	
by	participants.	Study	3	deals	with	the	use	of	precedents	and	references,	analyzing	
how	critics	respond	to	students’	ways	of	handling	intertextual	aspects	of	architec-
tural	design.	Study	4	focuses	on	the	material	and	spatial	set-up	of	critique—the	
differing	affordances	of	digital	slideshows	and	posters	for	presentation	and	dis-
cussion.	Critique	is	found	to	be	a	site	where	architectural	proposals	are	treated	
for	the	purposes	of	 instruction	as	provisional	and	improvable,	and	where	their	
significances	are	detailed	in	exhibitions	of	architectural	reasoning	and	judgment.	
Such	exhibiting	involves	identifying	and	elaborating	on	problems	and	qualities,	
and	articulating	values	that	are	visible	in	the	envisaged	buildings	and	their	graphi-
cal	representations.	These	interpretations	may	be	juxtaposed	with	the	expressed	
intentions	of	students,	as	these	appear	in	verbal	presentations	or	in	textual	accounts.	
Their	interrelations	are	inspected	and	discrepancies	are	noted	and	discussed.	On	
the	basis	of	the	analyses	in	the	thesis,	the	function	of	critique	is	argued	to	centre	
on	the	juxtaposition	of	student-produced	objects	with	professional	competences	
for	seeing,	articulating,	assessing,	and	contextualizing	these	objects.	In	organizing	
the	educational	program	around	cycles	of	production	and	critique,	architecture	
is	provided	with	a	powerful	means	through	which	design	competences,	and	the	
assessment	practices	that	lie	at	their	core,	can	be	made	massively	present	within,	
and	constitutive	of,	the	developmental	processes	through	which	students	acquire	
the	intellectual,	aesthetic,	and	discursive	repertoires	necessary	for	competent	ar-
chitectural	work.	
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Part One
the work of critique
in architectural
education
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The research reported here is an investigation of instruction and assess-
ment in architectural education. The focus is on the practice of critique, an 
educational activity in which instructors and professional architects give 
students feedback on their finished projects. This practice is approached as a 
perspicuous setting for analyzing the display and enactment of architectural 
competences, and for developing an understanding of how these compe-
tences are taught and learned. Taking an ethnomethodological (Garfinkel, 
1967) approach, the interests of the thesis revolve around questions of how 
critique is done as an occasioned instructional practice. The core of the 
thesis, Part 2, consists of four empirical studies. Part 1 should be seen as a 
way of framing the reading of the studies. It positions the studies in their 
theoretical and methodological context and discusses questions that are 
raised and implications that can be drawn from the empirical work. As the 
concern throughout is with participants’ ways of articulating and orient-
ing towards architectural knowledge and competence, some preliminary 
observations on the characteristics of architecture as practice and discipline 
is in order.
 First, architecture occupies a liminal position between art and construc-
tion. This means among other things that the qualities of an architectural 
proposal, as well as the competences and skills of the designer, are judged 
in terms of aesthetic, artistic, and conceptual as well as functional and tech-
nical considerations. The architect must handle the challenges of both art 
and engineering. Second, the range of phenomena relevant to architectural 
design is strikingly wide and open-ended. The success of a built environ-
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ment is dependent upon economical, political, geographical, and cultural 
factors, in addition to the purely aesthetic and functional ones. In sum, 
there can be said to be an interesting complexity in architectural practice—it 
represents an amalgam of competences otherwise often treated as distinct. 
Consequently, the objects produced by students, and assessed during cri-
tique, must be designed to take into account a multitude of disparate but 
interrelated, and sometimes conflicting values.
 In various accounts, from antiquity up until the present, this complex-
ity has been thought of as placing particular demands on the practitioner. 
In ancient Egypt, the great architect Imhotep “was revered for his great 
wisdom as a scribe, astronomer, magician and healer” (Kostof, 2000b, p. 
3). In the Ten Books on Architecture written around 25 B.C., the Roman 
scholar Vitruvius outlined the set of competences ideally possessed by the 
architect:
To be educated, he must be an experienced draftsman, well versed 
in geometry, familiar with history, a diligent student of philosophy, 
know music, have some acquaintance with medicine, understand the 
rulings of legal experts, and have a clear grasp of astronomy and the 
ways of Heaven. (1999, p. 22)
The aspiring architect should be naturally gifted, but also amenable to in-
struction—one whose skills in the arts and sciences were to be cultivated 
from childhood (or more specifically boyhood) and onwards, until finally 
reaching “the loftiest sanctuary of Architecture” (ibid.). Institutionalized 
programs of education were absent at the time of the writing of this treatise, 
and the training of architects was managed through apprenticeship pre-
ceded by liberal arts education—the medicine, music, law, and astronomy 
of Vitruvius’ account (MacDonald, 2000).
 Today, educational programs geared specifically at architecture serve as 
the principal means through which the competences required for skilled 
architectural work are reproduced. These programs are not apprentice-
ships in the traditional sense. Rather, architectural education can be seen 
as a form of practicum—an institutionalized setting specifically organized 
for teaching and learning, with its own modes of practice and assessment 
of skill and competence. Schön describes the character of a practicum as 
follows:
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The practicum is a virtual world, relatively free of the pressures, dis-
tractions, and risks of the real one, to which, nevertheless, it refers. It 
stands in an intermediate space between the practice world, the “lay” 
world of ordinary life, and the esoteric world of the academy. It is 
also a collective world in its own right, with its own mix of materials, 
tools, languages, and appreciations. It embodies particular ways of see-
ing, thinking, and doing that tend, over time, as far as the student is 
concerned, to assert themselves with increasing authority. (1987, p. 37)
Within the architectural practicum, critique has a central position as part of 
the ways in which the institution is organized so as to refer to disciplinary 
realities; it provides means through which architectural materials, tools, 
languages, and appreciations can relevantly come to assert themselves. In 
short, critique is a setting in which students meet and are made accountable 
for articulations and understandings of competent practice.
 Such articulations and understandings are seen in this thesis as forms 
of practical reasoning and judgment. For the latter notion, the writings of 
John Dewey may provide some grounding. In Art as Experience, Dewey 
(2005) discusses at length the nature of professional criticism. While not 
directly dealing with critique as delivered in educational settings, there is 
a central element of instruction in the ways in which Dewey conceives the 
role of the critic. In a perspicuous formulation, Dewey states that, “the 
function of criticism is the reëducation of perception of works of art; it is 
an auxiliary in the process, a difficult process, of learning to see and hear” 
(p. 338). Dewey’s concern is to establish an understanding of criticism as 
neither “judicial”—that is, applying established norms, standards, or rules 
to works of art—nor “impressionistic”—a standpoint that would exclude 
the possibility of objective judgment. In the impressionistic view, the stuff 
of criticism would be constituted by whatever subjective reactions the 
critic may have upon encountering a given piece. Judicial criticism, on the 
other hand, is explicated through a parallel with the practice of measure-
ment, in which a definitive standard is juxtaposed with the object under 
scrutiny, yielding a specification of the object in terms of quantity. In this 
connection Dewey notes, “the standard, being an external and public thing, 
is applied physically. The yardstick is physically laid down upon the things 
measured to determine their length” (p. 320). The critic, in contrast, is judg-
ing, not measuring physical fact:
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The child who can use a yardstick can measure as well as the most 
experienced and mature person, if he can handle the stick, since 
measuring is not judgment but is a physical operation performed 
for the sake of determining value in exchange or in behalf of some 
further physical operation [...] The same cannot be said of judg-
ment of the value of an idea or the value of a work of art. (p. 320)
Denying the relevance of judicial understandings does not mean that no 
logic or coherence can be found in criticism, that it would be purely im-
pressionistic, reducing all experiences of art to “a shifting kaleidoscope of 
meaningless incidents” (p. 318). It only implies that criticism is judgment, 
that it “involves a venture, a hypothetical element; that it is directed to 
qualities which are nevertheless qualities of an object” (p. 321). Judgment is 
for Dewey a general characteristic of human reasoning. It occurs when a 
situation is doubtful, but not completely obscure. It may be a case tried in 
court, or simply a situation in which “a moving blur catches our eye in the 
distance,” and we ask ourselves: “what is it?”
If [the situation] suggests, however vaguely, different meanings, ri-
val possible interpretations, there is some point at issue, some mat-
ter at stake. [...] Which of the alternative suggested meanings has 
the rightful claim? What does the perception really mean? How 
is it to be interpreted, estimated, appraised, placed? Every judg-
ment proceeds from some such situation. (1910/1991, p. 102)
Critique in architectural education would seem to be one candidate for 
such a situation of judgment, a focal event in the educational program 
where architectural reasoning is exhibited and highlighted for the purposes 
of instruction and assessment.
 Critique has been described as a cornerstone of design education (Par-
nell, Sara, Doidge, & Parsons, 2007). It constitutes the main form of assess-
ment in the education of architects and it is also increasingly recognized as 
an important instructional practice. The critique format is deployed world-
wide—in architecture as well as other design disciplines—and has retained 
its basic characteristics for many years. The practice may be considered one 
of the signature pedagogies (Shulman, 2005) of design education; where law 
employs the case-based dialogue, and medicine bedside teaching (ibid.), 
the concerns of architectural education converge in the production and 
critical scrutiny of design proposals. In addition, critique as a form of in-
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struction has been used as a model for educational activities outside design 
education. Hybrid activities have been proposed within such diverse fields 
as human-computer interaction (Kehoe, 2001), mathematics (Jurow, 2005; 
Jurow, Hall, & Ma, 2008; Shaffer, 2002, 2007), and teacher education (Bro-
cato, 2009), making use of iterations of production, criticism, and revision 
inspired by design studio work. Thus, it seems safe to say that an adequate 
account of critique is of central importance for understanding architectural 
and design education, and for informing the adoption and transformation 
of the practice in other settings. However, while critique and its signifi-
cance as a vehicle for student learning has been extensively debated within 
the field of architectural education (e.g. Anthony, 1987; Frederickson, 1990; 
Webster, 2005), very little research has documented and analyzed the work 
of critique—that is, the detailed real-world practical actions that constitute 
its achievement in situ. This is so in part as a result of a predilection in the 
literature to base analyses on participants’ post-hoc reports—often formu-
lations of experienced problems or benefits of the practice—and to present 
findings in the form of interview or questionnaire studies. The conclusions 
drawn are, as a rule, normative. Alternatively, or in addition, studies make 
theoretically motivated appraisals in terms of models of effective learning 
and instruction.
 In sum, these discussions proceed largely within a framework of peda-
gogical and didactic concerns about how to reform and improve archi-
tectural education. While in no way questioning the relevance of such 
discussions, it can be noted that critique itself, as a practical occasioned 
phenomenon, is curiously absent from the literature. The perspective taken 
in this thesis maintains that the constitutive practices of critique make up 
an unexamined phenomenal background to extant debates. It is unexam-
ined in the sense of being glossed in existing accounts. At the same time, 
the practical achievement of critique is relied upon as a resource when, for 
instance, directives for educational reform are formulated. It is by referring 
to and glossing features of practice that such formulations are recognizable 
by members as sensible, valid, and reasonable. This study, however, aims to 
turn this unexplicated resource into a topic of research. Thereby, a more nu-
anced understanding of the practical conditions for critique may be gained.
 The empirical material consists of a set of video recordings of final cri-
tique sessions at a Swedish school of architecture. In these sessions, students 
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present their finished projects—the result of work conducted individually 
or in groups over periods of several weeks or sometimes months—and 
receive feedback from an audience of peers, instructors, and practicing 
architects invited to the school. The main interest of the study lies in docu-
menting, describing, and analyzing the instructional work of critique. In 
particular, the analyses unpack the ways in which architecturally relevant 
competences, phenomena, and objects of knowledge are made visible in 
and as the practical actions of students and instructors.
 Some preliminary observations in relation to this interest can be made 
at the outset. The work of critique is fundamentally embodied work, car-
ried out through the concurrent use of a range of material and discursive 
resources. Topics that arise in the critique range from aesthetic judgments, 
through conceptual and metaphorical values of architectural forms and 
the soundness of constructions, to the usability of proposed buildings for 
envisaged inhabitants. Participants are unceasingly oriented to the physical 
materials—posters, projections, and models—making up the architectural 
proposals under scrutiny; the work of critique is thus deeply dependent on 
the forms of inscription and representation employed, and the technolo-
gies mediating the practice.
 Each of the four studies in the thesis focuses on one particular aspect of 
critique practice. Study 1 deals with issues of professional vision (Good-
win, 1994) and the ways in which the graphical surface of the presentation 
is seen. Study 2 addresses the significance of concepts and intentions in the 
setting. The study examines how the relation between students’ stated in-
tentions and the presented designs is treated by participants. Study 3 deals 
with the use of precedents and references, analyzing how critics respond to 
students’ ways of handling intertextual aspects of architectural design. Study 
4 focuses on the material and spatial set-up of critique—the mediation of 
presentations by means of digital slideshows and posters and the ways in 
which architecturally relevant phenomena are communicated, discussed 
and made visible in the sessions. While different in emphasis and scope, all 
studies share a concern with the instructional work of critique, and par-
ticipants’ practical orientations to the visibility of architectural knowledge.
 The remainder of Part 1 of the thesis, before the studies, consists of 
six chapters. Ethnomethodological perspectives on instructional work are 
articulated in the following chapter. Chapter 3 provides a brief historical 
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background, tracing the development of architectural practice and educa-
tion from antiquity to the present, after which, in Chapter 4, some previous 
work on architectural knowledge, design education, and critique in the 
present context is discussed. The fifth chapter outlines the analytical ap-
proach of the study, along with a description of methods and data materials. 
Chapter 6 contains summaries of the studies. Finally, Chapter 7 discusses 
some common themes emerging in the analyses. 
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The analytical approach of this thesis is extensively informed by think-
ing within ethnomethodology. Ethnomethodology, nominally the study 
of “people’s methods,” was founded in the work of Harold Garfinkel. Gar-
finkel introduces the ethnomethodological project as a mode of inquiry 
that aims “to treat practical activities, practical circumstances, and practical 
sociological reasoning as topics of empirical study” (1967, p. 1). Such studies 
are concerned with analyzing everyday practices and “seek to learn about 
them as phenomena in their own right” (ibid.).
 With a starting point in these formulations, a few key ideas in eth-
nomethodology can be expanded upon. First, the reference to practical 
activities and circumstances as a topic of study is not to be read as singling 
out a special kind of activity, distinguished by being particularly practical or 
“hands on,” but rather as pointing to the practical character of any activity 
as performed in the world. Fields such as astrophysics (Garfinkel, Lynch, & 
Livingston, 1981) or mathematics (Livingston, 1999) are as analyzable and 
describable in terms of the practical character of their constitutive activities 
and circumstances as is the work that goes into assembling a piece of furni-
ture from written instructions (Garfinkel, 2002). Thus, “inquiries of every 
imaginable kind, from divination to theoretical physics, claim our interest 
as socially organized artful practices” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 32). Rather than 
functioning as a demarcation, then, the term practical serves to signal a par-
ticular perspective on action; it highlights the open-ended non-formulaic 
nature of actual situations of conduct, which irremediably requires of ac-
tors that they assemble the materials at hand in a skilled artful manner in 
ethnomethodology and education
chapter 2 
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order both to act competently themselves, and make sense of others’ ac-
tions. Competent action, whether in everyday situations or in disciplinary 
settings, should be understood in terms of, as Garfinkel writes, “courses 
of common sense rationalities of judgment which involve the person’s 
uses of common sense knowledge of social structures over the temporal 
‘succession’ of here and now situations” (p. 68). It is the incremental, serial 
building of action, and the mundane reasoning and judgment that go into 
it, that is signaled by ethnomethodology’s insistence on the practical.
 From the introductory quotation, we learn that ethnomethodology takes 
an interest in reasoning, more specifically sociological reasoning. A number of 
issues may need to be clarified in relation to this. Announcing an interest 
in “sociological reasoning” should not be construed as pinpointing the 
work of sociologists as a favored focus for ethnomethodological studies 
(although sociological work is one possible topic, for instance Anderson & 
Sharrock, 1982; Maynard & Schaeffer, 2000). The point is, rather, that the 
everyday actor can be conceived as a “lay sociologist” who is continually 
engaged in interpreting his or her context of action and the identities or 
institutions constituted in and as the performance of action. It is by force 
of a robust practical knowledge of various forms of social structures that 
the actor maneuvers the everyday world. To understand further what can 
be meant by reasoning in this context—especially as analytical interests are 
shifted from everyday sociology to the more esoteric sense-making prac-
tices characterizing specialized work settings—we may turn to the work of 
Eric Livingston. Livingston has delved into the minute details of activities 
such as playing checkers (2006a), proving mathematical theorems (1999), 
reading poetry (2006b), and laying jigsaw puzzles (2008b). A central idea 
is that all these different domains are constituted by their distinct forms of 
reasoning, fitted and specific to the particular concerns and operations of 
the domain in which they figure. For instance, reasoning in the solving of 
jigsaw puzzles involves things such as the following:
Puzzle solvers will [...] find themselves making fine discriminations 
of shading, resorting to physically trying the different pieces and, in 
inarticulate ways, developing hopelessly embodied, motorkinetic per-
ceptions of the related shapes and detail of the pieces; they’ll develop 
local strategies for engaging in these procedures in systematic ways; they 
may even try to organize the pieces in terms of the shapes and sizes of 
23
the pieces’ “holes” and “knobs.” Between these extremes of border and 
undifferentiated background, there is the work of discovering relation-
ships between, and connecting, different clumps of fitted pieces and of 
extending the developing structures already in place. (2008a, p. 844)
Forms of reasoning such as these are difficult to reduce to general charac-
terizations of cognitive operations. Thus, to turn to another of Livingston’s 
domains of study, “reasoning in checkers isn’t a form of universal reasoning 
that’s applied to the play of checkers; it’s a type of reasoning indigenous to, 
living within, and sustained by the practices of crossboard play” (2008b, p. 
8). Skill and reasoning are seen as related phenomena. Similarly, percep-
tion and embodied action feature as integral parts of any performance 
of reasoning in the world. For Livingston, examining checkers, origami, 
or the work involved in performing psychological experiments involves 
looking at “the interrelationships between skill, reasoning, perception and 
embodied action” (p. 9). In a similar fashion, architectural critique sessions 
can be seen seen as activities in which particular forms of reasoning are 
exhibited; forms of reasoning tied to the interpretation and assessment of 
architectural proposals.
 Ethnomethodology seeks to learn about practical activities as “phenom-
ena in their own right” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 1). This means that social in-
teractional phenomena under study are considered worthy of analytical 
attention in themselves. Their function is not to feature as mere illustrations 
of points derived from social scientific theory, or to be subsumed under 
some pre-conceived scheme or argument. In the ethnomethodological 
project, detailed empirical work takes precedence, and the hoped-for out-
come consists of explications of the “seen but unnoticed” ordinary prac-
tices through which members in social settings achieve those same settings. 
Through such explications, theoretical issues may be respecified and recast 
as participants’ concerns.
 A central premise for understanding the ways in which members achieve 
the order of social settings is that activities are produced to be account-
able—that is, observable, recognizable, and describable as the activities they 
(accountably) are. As Anderson and Sharrock phrase this central idea:
Activities can be seen as organized in order to produce the products 
they do. Such a strategy makes it permissible to speak of social actors 
as producing the routine, ordinary orderliness that their lives have by 
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recognizably doing for example, t.v. watching, drinking with friends, 
shopping with the family, writing academic papers. (1984, p. 103)
In Garfinkel’s words, accountability refers to the character of social ac-
tions of being produced to be “observable-and-reportable, i.e. available to 
members as situated practices of looking-and-telling” (1967, p. 1). Similarly, 
actions and accounts are characterized by reflexivity, which refers to their 
self-organized, self-explicative nature. There is thus a strong sense that the 
orderliness of social action is visible, available, and there, in and as its local 
production; this means among other things that if we ask what it is people 
are doing, what some social setting or activity is, and how it is produced, 
that production will be available to us as analysts. There is no immediate 
need to look elsewhere for explanatory frameworks in order to understand 
a sequence of activity. We may use a camera to record some set of unfolding 
activities and trust that they will be richly and visibly textured with the 
local relevancies and projects of participants. In the first instance, of course, 
that texture is there for members, and provides inter alia a basic grounding 
of the ways in which social practices are learnable.
 I will return to the phenomenon of visibility in connection to learning 
and instruction when discussing the application of ethnomethodology to 
educational practice. First, however, it is useful to note one final character-
istic of this tradition; ethnomethodology is characterized by a commitment 
to a thoroughly non-ironic perspective on studied phenomena. This policy 
is usually conceptualized under the rubric of ethnomethodological indifference:
[A] leading policy is to refuse serious consideration to the prevailing pro-
posal that efficiency, efficacy, effectiveness, intelligibility, consistency, 
planfulness, typicality, uniformity, reproducibility of activities—i.e., that 
rational properties of practical activities—be assessed, recognized, cat-
egorized, described by using a rule or a standard obtained outside actual 
settings within which such properties are recognized, used, produced, 
and talked about by settings’ members. All procedures whereby logical 
and methodological properties of the practices and results of inquiries are 
assessed in their general characteristics by rule are of interest as phenomena 
for ethnomethodological study but not otherwise. (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 33)
Thus, for instance, when examining the practical character of scientific 
work, this is done without the intention of constructing a critique of sci-
entists for being less rational or objective than is normally claimed. Instead, 
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an ethnomethodological study of scientific practice respecifies (Garfinkel, 
1991) for instance objectivity or rationality as the practical achievement 
of members; we may learn what objectivity consists of, how inquiries are 
made so as to exhibit the properties that warrant the ascription of ob-
jectivity to them. Such a mode of analysis provides resources for a “non-
ironic sociology,” which, “explicates, rather than downgrades, members’ 
knowledge without analytic stipulation and imposition of […] an external 
standard, and instead has regard to the practical (e.g. descriptive) adequacy 
of some item of knowledge to the situation of which it is an inextricable 
part” (Watson, 1994, p. 173).
 While the analyst should abstain from assessing the practices under scru-
tiny, it is also clear that members’ own practices for assessing the rationality 
or objectivity of findings are available as a practical and researchable phe-
nomenon. In a way, this is a useful formulation of the aim of this thesis; to 
examine a set of procedures for the assessment of logical and methodologi-
cal properties of the practices and results of students’ inquiries, exhibited 
in and as their production and presentation of architectural proposals. It 
is orders of practical reasoning such as these that the studies seek to learn 
about, as phenomena in their own right.
conversation and work
As the recorded interactions to a substantive extent consist of talk, the 
literature within the tradition of conversation analysis (CA) (Sacks, 1992; 
Schegloff, 2007) has provided an important backdrop to, and resource for, 
the analytical work in this thesis. Although the studies reported here are not 
conversation analytic in the sense of attempting to systematically study the 
structure of conversational action as such, CA represents a body of empiri-
cal findings concerning the ways in which utterances accomplish actions, 
critical for understanding what it is participants are doing in the sessions, 
and also provides a set of analytical resources with which to approach talk-
in-interaction. Much of the ethnomethodological literature cited is also 
based in part on, or is informed by, conversation analytic work—it is dif-
ficult to draw sharp distinctions between the two fields (although see Bjelic 
& Lynch, 1992; Lynch, 1993, for a discussion of foundational differences). 
In the studies, conversation analysis features in two main ways; first, as a 
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resource for understanding singular actions or sequences in the interactions 
under scrutiny; and second, as providing a set of general resources, or ways 
of thinking, about the character and analyzability of talk-in-interaction and 
social action more generally.
 One central analytical resource is the notion of sequentiality. Recall that 
Garfinkel characterized practical action as “courses of common sense ra-
tionalities of judgment which involve the person’s uses of common sense 
knowledge of social structures over the temporal ‘succession’ of here and 
now situations” (1967, p. 68). The conversation analytic work of Sacks, 
Schegloff, Jefferson and others from the 1960s and onwards can be said to 
consist of the detailed exploration of how actors employ common sense 
knowledge of the structures of conversation, in and as their production and 
inspection of ordered turns-at-talk. It is a forceful demonstration of the 
serial and sequential, turn-by-turn, achievement of social action. A premise 
in this work is that in the production of a sequence of conversation, “each 
participant’s talk is inspectable, and is inspected, by co-participants to see 
how it stands to the one that preceded, what sort of response it has ac-
corded the preceding turn” (Schegloff, 2007, p. 1). The sense of any singular 
turn will depend on its relation to what came before, and on the sorts of 
subsequent actions it projects or makes relevant. This is a general feature 
of action as seen from an ethnomethodological perspective, and provides 
the analyses with a resource with which to understand context as a dynamic 
ongoing production. To quote Goodwin and Heritage:
Every action is simultaneously context shaped (in that the framework 
of action from which it emerges provides primary organization for its 
production and interpretation) and context renewing (in that it now helps 
constitute the frame of relevance that will shape subsequent action). 
(1990, p. 289)
There is a prospective-retrospective dimension to the establishment of 
shared understandings in conversation, which means that the meaning of 
an utterance is not settled, for participants, at the point of its production. 
In Garfinkel’s convoluted but apt formulation:
For the sensible character of an expression, upon its occurrence 
each of the conversationalists as auditor of his own as well as the 
other’s productions had to assume as of any present accomplished 
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point in the exchange that by waiting for what he or the other per-
son might have said at a later time the present significance of what 
had already been said would have been clarified. Thus many ex-
pressions had the property of being progressively realized and re-
alizable through the further course of the conversation. (1967, p. 41)
As each subsequent action constitutes a displayed understanding of what 
went before (cf. Moerman & Sacks, 1971/1988), speakers can monitor, 
and if necessary, initiate repair (Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977) in a 
next turn of their own. Such repair after next turn—typically in the con-
versational slot of third position following upon the repairable—provides 
what Schegloff terms a “structurally provided defense of intersubjectivity” 
(1992, p. 1295). That is, “the turn-taking system has, as a by-product of its 
design, a proof procedure for the analysis of turns” (Sacks, Schegloff, & 
Jefferson, 1974, p. 728). Furthermore, and crucially, in this procedure, “lies a 
central methodological resource for the investigation of conversation, [...] 
a resource provided by the thoroughly interactional character of conversa-
tion” (ibid.). While the proof procedure primarily constitutes a resource 
for participants’ on-line analysis of displayed understandings, these displays 
“are available as well to professional analysts, who are thereby afforded a 
proof criterion (and a search procedure) for the analysis of what a turn’s talk 
is occupied with” (p. 729). The next turn proof procedure thus provides a 
guide for deciding which of a set of alternative plausible interpretations of 
a given utterance or sequence of utterances should be used in the analyses.
 Sequential analysis helps sort out what a given turn does, that is, if it 
should be seen as for instance a complaint, a question, an answer, or a cor-
rection of a prior turn. In understanding what participants are doing in 
the work of critique, an additional concern will be the topical aspects of 
talk, that is, what the talk is about, and how it may be understood as part 
of, for instance, an instructional project. As Garfinkel points out in a gen-
eral characterization of a stretch of conversational interaction, “the sense 
of the expressions depended upon where the expression occurred in se-
rial order, the expressive character of the terms that comprised it, and the 
importance to the conversationalists of the events depicted” (1967, p. 41). 
Thus, Garfinkel indicates aspects of interaction which to certain extents 
go beyond sequential positioning of turns, and touch upon such things as 
the meaningful use of categories, and the ways in which talk is implicated 
28
in the practical projects of participants—the work they are engaged in. In 
an analysis of the work of teaching, and listening to, a lecture in chemistry, 
Garfinkel discusses the features of “exhibiting understanding” in relation 
to questions posed by the teacher. He remarks:
Such features are not to be seen only in its objective products, name-
ly, its talk structures. Rather, they are to be explicated by reference 
to such attendant features as the sequential character of this lecture 
vis-à-vis the next lecture producing as its end result the ability to 
treat an exam, where the exam provides a guide to how to be listen-
ing so as to be finding in the talk those places where later account-
ability criteria of understanding will be administered. (2002, p. 239)
Addressing such aspects of interaction, the tradition which has become 
known as ethnomethodological studies of work is concerned with elucidating 
the “phenomenal field properties” (ibd.) of situated practices, of which the 
structure of talk is but one component. In such a mode of analysis:
[T]here is a unique preoccupation with local production and with 
the worldly observability of reasoning. This means that reasoning is 
displayed in the midst of orders of intersubjectively accountable de-
tails. [...] A key aim of such analyses is to describe [...] competencies 
as demonstrable courses of inquiry with distinctive materials at hand, 
whether those materials are conversational utterances, embodied places 
in a queue, or flasks and beakers being handled by an experiment-
er. Painstaking attention to the detailed production of such exhib-
its then enables the analysis to specify their constitutional properties 
as orderly structures. (Lynch, Livingston, & Garfinkel, 1983, p. 207)
The original interests of Harvey Sacks, whose work provided the founda-
tion for CA, were also directed at far wider phenomena than conversa-
tion conceived structurally and sequentially. His lectures were concerned, 
for instance, with the analysis of membership categorization (cf. Hester 
& Eglin, 1997), a topic virtually neglected within mainstream CA. These 
wider interests leads Watson (1994) to suggest that, rather than Lectures on 
Conversation, entitling the publication of Sacks’ lectures along the lines of 
Harvey Sacks: Mind, Language and Society, would have done more justice to 
the range of issues with which he was concerned. In sum, although CA 
offers resources for understanding naturally occurring talk-in-interaction, 
the ethnomethodological interests of this thesis as applied to instructional 
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work and the visibility of architectural reasoning, are not properly charac-
terized as conversation or interaction analytic. Rather, the analyses aim to 
contribute to a study of work, “describing competencies as demonstrable 
courses of inquiry with distinctive materials at hand” (Lynch, et al., 1983, 
p. 207).
ethnomethodological studies of instruction
Ethnomethodological and conversation analytic perspectives have been 
applied in various ways to educational settings. Hester and Francis (2000) 
identify a number of broad themes in ethnomethodological studies of edu-
cation. An early and enduring topic has been educational decision-making, that 
is, the practices of various educational professionals for “allocating, assess-
ing, testing, grading, sorting, referring” (p. 8). Analyses have also been done 
of standardized educational assessment and standardized testing, demonstrating 
the interactionally contingent and practically achieved nature of test results 
(e.g. Maynard & Marlaire, 1992). The topic that is the most extensively 
studied is classroom order and management. Focusing on “classroom control 
and the identification and management of deviance” and “the sequential 
organization of interaction between teachers and pupils” (Hester & Fran-
cis, 2000, p. 9), these studies examine the achievement of the interactional 
formats of educational practices, and the skilled management of cohorts of 
students (McHoul, 1978; Payne & Hustler, 1980). Interactional formats in-
clude, for instance, the familiar expectancies that students are to speak only 
when invited to do so by the teacher, and otherwise design their embodied 
presence as being within certain classroom limits (e.g. Macbeth, 1990). A 
prototypical topic here would be the initiation-response-evaluation (IRE) 
sequence, characteristic of much classroom interaction (e.g. Mehan, 1979), 
and the organization of repair and correction (Macbeth, 2004; McHoul, 
1990). Closely related is the production of classroom activities and events; how 
for instance lessons and other educational activities or elements within 
them are initiated and brought to a close, and how they are collaboratively 
sustained as the recognizable activities they are (e.g. A study of the work of 
teaching undergraduate chemistry, in Garfinkel, 2002). A fifth theme, most 
closely affiliated with the work presented here, is constituted by studies of 
the practical organization and accomplishment of academic knowledge.
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 Hester and Francis note that this last topic has been relatively neglected 
in ethnomethodology. It could be argued that much of the work has been 
concerned with aspects of educational settings other than the learning, in-
structional work, and disciplinary knowledge that in a sense form the focal 
concern for teachers and students much of their time. In a characterization 
of the sociology of education outside ethnomethodology, but which can be 
brought to bear on some of the work within this tradition as well, McHoul 
and Watson write:
Classroom interaction studies have typically overlooked—whilst at 
the same time inevitably counting upon—what for the interested par-
ties in a given scene (there and then) are the characteristic, distinc-
tive and essential features of their activities, namely those of teaching 
and learning about ‘subjects’ as incarnate in ‘lessons.’ This might be 
termed ‘education’s essential work.’ Furthermore, for interested parties, 
the ‘quiddity’ of the lesson comprises what this lesson, here and now, 
involves, as a particular in situ realisation of that work. (1987, p. 284)
The rough taxonomy presented by Hester and Francis, however, should not 
be read as a list of mutually exclusive fields of study. For instance, an interest 
in interactional formats may very well be instrumental in an examination 
of the ways in which those formats structure the practical accomplishment 
of academic knowledge. Consider, for example, the IRE sequence. On the 
one hand, educational practice can be examined for the ways in which IRE 
sequences are achieved and upheld in classroom interaction; an analysis of 
how deviations are sanctioned, for instance, could provide insights into 
how pupils learn to recognize and collaboratively produce the recognizable 
things called lessons. On the other hand, the use of the IRE sequence could 
be analyzed for the ways in which its format makes available to students 
some sense of what the lesson is about, and furnishes a position in which a 
contribution to a topic not yet mastered or fully known can be made. The 
question and the ensuing and awaited evaluation provide an interactional 
niche into which learners’ contributions can be fitted, and which allows 
for a treatment of those contributions as, provisionally, mathematical. The 
precise formulation of the question in relation to the answer, and of the 
evaluation in relation to both, can be inspected in different ways by student 
and teacher to find resources for their respective tasks; for the student to 
understand something of the mathematics that is being asked about, and for 
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the teacher to see in just what detailed ways the answer is to be corrected, 
modified, or elaborated, or how the question may need to be restated for a 
given something to be communicated. Scholarly thinking along these lines 
has perhaps been most clearly developed by Douglas Macbeth. As for the 
IRE sequence, Macbeth characterizes this format, the question with the 
known answer, as a “workhorse” of direct instruction. The IRE sequence, 
in short, is one method through which knowledge and competence can 
be “leveraged into view, and use” (2000, p. 24):
In the interactional coherence of things like turn taking and assess-
ments, worlds are brought into view as well. Talk-in-interaction 
achieves not only an analyzable order of interaction, but an or-
dered world of sensible action and common understanding. (p. 26)
The combined interests in interactional work and the ways in which 
knowledge and competence are made visible amounts to an approach to 
the study of education characterized by Macbeth as a “sociology of in-
struction” (1994, p. 312). Such a sociology explores how social worlds are 
constructed as “fields of structure, meaning, and gestalt that can be taught 
and learned” (p. 314). Elsewhere, Macbeth (2003) refers to this approach as 
affording naturalistic analyses of educational settings. The term naturalistic 
is introduced in order to make a distinction with critical discourse analysis, 
which signals, again, an ethnomethodologically indifferent perspective on 
the practices under scrutiny. Apart from discussing critical theory as applied 
to education, Macbeth describes how the tradition of naturalistic analysis, 
when it first emerged, effected a radical shift in how competences and skills 
in educational settings were conceived, and how they could be studied. 
The shift can be characterized as involving a repositioning of skills and 
competences as visible, public, and concrete, as opposed to hidden, private, 
and accessible only through formal analysis and theoretical conjecture. In 
an appraisal of Hugh Mehan’s  (1979) Learning Lessons, Macbeth formulates 
the matter thusly: “things like competence and its interactional work—
and they were ‘things’ now, ordinary, vernacular things—were available 
for study precisely because they were themselves public fields of action” 
(2003, p. 243). Thus, one can see teaching and instructional work, as well 
as the work of being instructed, as accomplished through instructors’ on-
line analysis of the visible actions of learners, and concomitantly through 
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learners’ analyses of the actions of instructors. As Nishizaka observes of the 
embodied work of violin instruction:
The teacher’s positive evaluation is based on what the child actually did 
in front of the teacher, not on any kind of inference from the child’s be-
havior about what takes place inside the child. Indeed, whatever (experi-
ential or neurological) processes or events take place inside the child is ir-
relevant to the evaluation of the child’s completion of a task. (2006, p. 122) 
In a very pragmatic sense, then, access to internal mechanisms, schemata, or 
mental models as explanatory resources fails to surface as a methodological 
and analytical issue, for the very simple reason that such access is denied 
participants as well. Instead, studies within an ethnomethodologically in-
formed sociology of instruction take advantage of the visibility of practical 
action, its observable-reportable (Garfinkel, 1967) character, and describe 
the public, phenomenal fields in which participants in educational settings 
operate. The approach can be said to be a praxeological one, which locates 
the analysis of cognition and understanding “in the orderly production and 
recognizability of actions as they are designed, dealt with and, if necessary, 
repaired by participants” (Mondada, 2006, p. 118; cf. Goodwin, 2000; Moer-
man & Sacks, 1971/1988; Sacks, et al., 1974).
 Studies consonant with this approach have been conducted in several 
settings, within and outside institutionalized education. They include anal-
yses of science education (Amerine & Bilmes, 1988; Koschmann & Zemel, 
2009; Lindwall & Lymer, 2008; Lynch & Macbeth, 1998), mathematics 
(Greiffenhagen, 2008), second-language learning (Lee, 2004), geography 
(McHoul & Watson, 1987), handicrafts (Ekström, Lindwall, & Säljö, 2009), 
violin playing (Nishizaka, 2006), archaeology (Goodwin, 1994), dentistry 
(Hindmarsh, Reynolds, & Dunne, in press), surgery (Koschmann, Lebaron, 
Goodwin, & Feltovich, in press), control room practice (Hindmarsh & 
Heath, 2000), aviation (Melander & Sahlström, 2009), the use of mobile 
phones (Weilenmann, 2010), and numerous other subjects and settings. 
Taken together, this body of work testifies to the domain specificity of the 
modes of reasoning, perception, skill, and embodied action that make up 
the shop-floor practices of instructional work, whether this work is done 
as the focal business of educational professionals, or as seemingly peripheral 
aspects of workplace interactions and everyday activities.
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 The contribution that analyses of this kind may make is not in the first 
instance normative; they do not in themselves provide formulations of 
what ought to be, but rather enrich and nuance extant understandings of 
how the analyzed practices work. However, as exemplified by for instance, 
developments within fields such as Computer Supported Collaborative 
Work (CSCW) and Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), ethnographic 
and ethnomethodological research may function as a valuable conversa-
tional partner in efforts to design and reform practice (cf. Button, 2000; 
Dourish, 2006). As Hester and Francis note:
If ethnomethodological studies of technology are taken as precedent 
[...] then professional educationists may find more of practical rel-
evance in ethnomethodological studies of the detail of education-
al activities than can be found in other kinds of sociological work. 
Arguably, it is through such detailed inquiries that ‘self-reflection’ 
and hence improved practice may best be promoted. (2000, p. 7)
Study 4 ventures in a design oriented direction, adopting an approach in-
formed by design ethnography in CSCW and HCI to tentatively suggest 
design implications that may be drawn from the inquiries into details of 
practice making up the core of the study. The contribution of the thesis, 
however, lies more in “the ways of thinking it supports” (Dourish, 2006, 
p. 549) than any directly prescriptive implications that may be formulated 
based on those ways of thinking. Its logic, thus, is primarily analytical and 
empirical (ibid.).
 In the empirical work making up the body of this thesis, the ethnometh-
odological approach to instruction sketched above will be applied to analy-
ses of instruction in architectural education. Architecture, as a historically 
developed practice and discipline and as an educational concern, will be 
the topic of the following two chapters.
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This chapter first outlines some developmental threads in the practice of 
architecture—changes in the professional status of the architect, and in the 
ways in which educational practices have been organized in relation to 
these changes. Second, studies of architecture in the present are reviewed. 
The historical account serves the purpose of placing the current modes 
of architectural reasoning and assessment in context. It highlights in par-
ticular the role of representations and inscriptions so prominent in present 
day critique—the objects scrutinized in the design reviews are assemblies 
of elaborate inscriptions, rather than the concrete, brick, steel, and glass 
of which the built environment is made. In sum, this chapter sketches the 
interrelationships between renderings and reasoning (Ivarsson, 2004) in past 
and present architectural work.
an historical backdrop
Critique as conducted in 2007 at a Swedish school of architecture is a 
practice resting on a long tradition. While the critique event in its present 
form originates in the École des Beaux-Arts in Paris in the nineteenth 
century (Anthony, 1987), some of the modes of assessment employed, the 
issues made relevant in the critique, and the understandings of competent 
practice for which students are made accountable, have socio-historical 
counterparts in ancient Egypt, Greece, and Rome. The ways in which 
architectural knowledge is constituted and made relevant in the video-re-
cordings analyzed here thus represent the current state of a developmental 
process with a rich and multifaceted background. In some respects, what 
renderings and reasoning in architecture
chapter 3
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has counted as architectural knowledge and competence has been remark-
ably consistent through the documented history of the profession. There 
have, however, been some significant fluctuations, in particular in the posi-
tion of the architect vis-à-vis builders, influencing the ways in which the 
relation between theory and practice in the discipline has been conceived; 
that is, the extent to which architecture has been thought of as something 
distinct from the mastery of building.
 In ancient Egypt, the replacement of wood and clay by stone as the 
prime building material, at least for the larger structures of royal tombs and 
palaces, introduced the need for technical specification of the measures of 
individual blocks, which were often quarried and cut far from the building 
site (Kostof, 2000b). As Turnbull notes, “drawing of some kind is a necessity 
for instructing the other masons how to cut the stones and where to lay 
them” (1993, p. 321). Building could no longer proceed in an ad hoc fashion 
with the materials at hand. Specialized professional bodies of knowledge 
tied to this more theoretically informed mode of building emerged. Simi-
lar to later incarnations of the architectural profession, architecture was 
thought to span vast areas of competence and skill. The deity to whom 
architects devoted their reverence was Seshat, “Lady of the builders, of 
writing, and of the House of Books” (Kostof, 2000b, p. 6). Sometimes, Ses-
hat was replaced by Thot, who was the god of science, and in other sources 
by Ptah, the god of crafts. This constellation, Kostof observes, “neatly scans 
the total scope of architecture, from pure theory on the one hand to the 
practical knowhow of construction on the other” (ibid.).
 All formal education, including that of architects, was tied to the priest-
ly class, and in many ways organized through direct lineage. Knowledge 
of design and building techniques was passed down from father to son, 
engendering successive generations of architectural dynasties (there is a 
record of 25 generations of architects, from Kanofer and his son Imhotep, 
to Khnumibre in the fifth century B.C.). The knowledge held by Egyptian 
architects seemed to have involved the design skills required for calculat-
ing proportions and shapes of buildings, devising graphical representa-
tions on papyrus, leather, or wood, as well as a command of the building 
techniques necessary for their function as “overseer of works.” The same 
individuals, who were highly esteemed, and lived and worked close to the 
pharaonic circles, were regularly in charge of both design and construction. 
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Many of the remnants of detailed architectural representations found may 
therefore have been made for the architect himself—there was no need 
for anyone else to know the full specifications of the project. The scale of 
these projects, however, seemed to have required that building tasks were 
delegated—there is evidence of the use of temporary representations and 
designs, drawn on flakes of limestone, that were probably handed to lower 
ranking builders on the site. Already at this early point in the history of the 
profession, then, design tasks were at least in part distinguishable from the 
work of building. This engendered versions of the prototypical work prac-
tices associated with modern day architecture—those of devising graphical 
representations, which were used to communicate and at least to a degree 
specify the design for the purposes of collaboration with other disciplinary 
niches.
 It has been a somewhat contentious issue whether or not, or to what 
degree and in what ways, graphical representations were used by architects 
in antiquity and during medieval times. Some have argued that Greek 
architecture was so standardized and bound to tradition that the architect 
did not need plans or elevations, but rather worked on-site as a “mas-
ter craftsman,” or master-carpenter, which is the original meaning of the 
word architecton. Specifications were, in this view, given verbally to the 
stonemason at the building site. Kostof questions this theory, and points to, 
among other sources, Vitruvius, whose Ten Books on Architecture (Rowland 
& Howe, 1999) was an attempt to provide a summary of classical archi-
tectural knowledge. As much of this was based on a Greek tradition, “it 
is very improbable that a chronicler so anxious to record the traditional 
knowledge of his profession would neglect to point out the peculiarity of 
an exclusively verbal communication between architect and builder if this 
had been the case” (Kostof, 2000b, p. 15). In Roman architecture, there is 
ample evidence of the use of graphical representations. It was at this time 
that the primary representational tools used by architects were first system-
atically described:
Design is the apt placement of things, and the elegant effect obtained 
by their arrangement according to the nature of the work. The species 
of design, which are called ideai in Greek, are these: ichnography (plan), 
orthography (elevation), and scenography. Ichnography is the skillful use, 
to scale, of compass and rule, by means of which the on-site layout of 
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the design is achieved. Next, orthography is a frontal image, one drawn 
to scale, rendered according to the layout for the future work. As for 
scenography, it is the shaded rendering of the front and the receding sides 
as the latter converge on a point. These species are produced by analysis 
and invention. Analysis is devoted concern and vigilant attention to the 
pleasing execution of a design. Next, invention is the unraveling of ob-
scure problems, arriving, through energetic flexibility, at a new set of 
principles. These are the terms for design. (Vitruvius, 1999, pp. 24-25)
The education of Greek architects was reserved for the upper classes—as 
were most forms of institutionalized education—and included a theoreti-
cal liberal arts part, as well as practical apprenticeships at architectural work 
sites. Often, Greek architects would begin their education in a practical 
building-craft, or even sculpture, in parallel with attending a private tutor 
who taught the classical disciplines (art, philosophy, rhetoric, etc.). There 
are also records of professional schools, organized by practicing architects 
(Kostof, 2000c). The various fields of knowledge the command of which 
Vitruvius described as required of the Roman architect have already been 
noted. There seems to have been a somewhat wider range of possible career 
paths in the Roman Empire. Architects could be recruited from the ranks 
of military engineers, and even slaves were likely to have been allowed to 
climb within the hierarchies of the imperial civil service to positions as 
architects (MacDonald, 2000). For all these, however, training involved 
extensive theoretical study as well as knowledge of the practicalities of 
construction.
 During medieval times, there is some evidence that the theoretical side 
of architecture dwindled to some extent. While the Byzantine tradition 
preserved an academic education for what they termed the mechanicus, as 
opposed to the more practically oriented architekton, Europe, and it seems 
also medieval Islam, saw no need for theorists in building. There was no 
longer a clear line to be drawn between architect and master mason. Instead 
of the learned gentleman architect of Vitruvius, the medieval architect 
“rose from the ranks of the building crafts, carpentry or the working of 
stone or commonly both, and took part in the actual process of construc-
tion alongside the building crew as one of their own” (Kostof, 2000a, p. 
61). According to some historians, the classical representational tradition 
of ichnography, ortography and scenography was not resurrected until the 
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thirteenth century. Instead, the architect/builder laid out the plan in full 
scale, directly on the ground of the building site. The erection of stable 
structures based on this layout would then be guided by routine practice 
as exercised within the guild where the architect had been trained (ibid).
 Turnbull (1993) maintains that even such grand structures as Gothic 
cathedrals, such as the one in Chartres, were products of “ad-hoc collective 
work” (p. 315) rather than of the execution of a detailed master plan. The 
cathedrals employed several generations of teams of builders, in a context 
where there were no standardized common measures to coordinate work 
and provide continuity in the building process. A solution to this was the 
use of templates, patterns outlined on thin pieces of wood, used by a stone-
mason to cut particular standardized shapes of stone. Turnbull writes:
This small item of representational technology has much of the pow-
er of a scientific theory; it manifests the integration of science and 
technology and theory and practice, and it is a solution to the cen-
tral problem of how knowledge was transmitted. It was the use of 
templates, along with constructional geometry and a relatively small 
range of simple tools—compasses, straightedge, and string—that, 
in an experimental context, enabled the construction of extreme-
ly high, radically innovative buildings without a common system 
of measurement and, in the early Gothic period, perhaps without 
drawn plans and without continuity of architects or design. (p. 317)
Looking at Chartres, one finds a messy and “bewildering variety of but-
tresses, fliers, roofs, doors, and windows” (p. 318). From standardized shapes 
of stone, cut with the help of templates, and organized according to simple 
geometric rules rather than calculations of the magnitudes of forces in the 
construction, enduring and stable structures could be erected. “The kind 
of structural knowledge passed on from master to apprentice related sizes 
to spaces and heights to ratios, such as half the number of feet in a span 
expressed in inches plus one inch will give the depth of a hardwood joist” 
(p. 323). The transmission of this kind of practical knowledge was organ-
ized through lodges, which were originally buildings on the construction 
site where the stonemasons worked. These lodges gradually transformed 
into cooperative institutions for the reproduction of knowledge and skill 
“through apprenticeship, mutual exchange, and accumulation” (p. 329)—
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the guilds that for a long time organized professional practice and training 
in medieval Europe.   
 In the later part of the cathedral-building period, in the middle of the 
13th century, the classical technologies of plan, elevation, and perspective 
were rediscovered, and the role of master mason changed to that of archi-
tect; “theory became divorced from practice, and skill became expertise” 
(p. 330).
As the social and professional status of the architect rose, the ma-
son dropped gradually into the role of serving merely as a build-
er for the architect. As execution and design became separate, 
the education and training of the mason and the architect be-
came distinct. A new-style gentleman architect emerged who did 
not serve an apprenticeship but learned from books and thereby 
avoided the taint of being, or associating with, craftsmen. (p. 331)
The renaissance saw a further chiseling out of the professional status of 
the architect as distinct from masons and carpenters. In reviving Vitruvian 
ideals of architecture as a liberal art, architects of the day strived to dis-
tance themselves both from the purely practical building crafts, from the 
sculptors and painters, but also from those who knew nothing about the 
practical side of construction. Architecture’s distinctiveness lay in the com-
bination of these varied competences as exercised in practical application 
to the art of building. An increased distancing from the building site, and a 
position in which the often detailed requirements set out by the wealthy 
patrons were transformed and communicated to the building professionals, 
led to an increased reliance on drawings and models (Wilkinson, 2000).
 In 1671, the Academie Royale d’Architecture was established, as the first 
formalized program for the training of architects, devoted to providing the 
royal building administration with skilled designers (Rosenfeld, 2000). For 
a long time, even into the 20th century, such academic educational insti-
tutions lived alongside more traditional forms of apprenticeship training. 
Due to a lack of formal certification, “architects” were often builders or 
contractors who took care of all the stages from design to construction, but 
without formal training in any of the architectural schools (Draper, 2000). 
The revolutionary government closed The Academie Royale in 1793, but 
the school was later reopened as the Institute de France. In 1807 the École 
des Beaux-Arts was formed as a separate academic school devoted to archi-
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tecture (Blackford Mewburn, 2009). The school was organized in ateliers 
each led by a practicing architect or professor who passed on his knowledge 
of architecture by working closely with the students, giving feedback and 
instruction as they worked on their assigned projects. The Ecole attracted 
many students from other European countries, as well as the U.S.; when 
architectural academic institutions were formed all over the world, they 
were to a large extent modeled on the Beaux-Arts system (Draper, 2000).
 This system privileged drawing, aesthetics, and design, and involved a 
further distancing from direct experience of building so important in ear-
lier forms of architectural training. Debates began concerning how best to 
deal with the relation between theory and practice in architectural educa-
tion. As we have seen, this relation has been a central issue fraught with 
contention throughout the history of the profession, and it continues to 
this day. Cuff (1990), for instance, questions the separation of design work 
from the realities of compromise and negotiation of working life (see the 
next section); and architects’ lack of knowledge of both construction and 
user needs is often lamented (see e.g. Brown & Moreau Yates, 2000). The 
move to the academy, however, was not simply a move from practice to 
theory, but a move towards the establishment of partly new forms of prac-
tice, with a stronger emphasis on representation and inscription:
The role of architectural representations became, over time, 
more prominent until it took over from the oral practices of the 
guilds and became the primary site for the epistemological prac-
tices of the profession. In formal education, the representation be-
came the primary means for students to deploy and display learn-
ing and develop design judgment. (Blackford Mewburn, 2009, p. 23)
studies of contemporary architectural practice
While the historical studies recounted in the previous section by necessity 
were archaeological in nature, the present state of architectural practice is 
readily researchable by means of methods of direct observation. Rather 
than opting to be “archaeologists by choice” (Cicourel, 1964) and studying 
textual traces and residua of architectural practice, many researchers have 
applied various forms of ethnographic and video-analytic methods to the 
topic. In this section, therefore, we turn to research that lies closer in its 
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methodology and analytical approach to the studies reported in this thesis.
In a study of architecture in the U.S., Cuff (1990) analyzes current architec-
tural practice through interviews and observations at several architectural 
firms. One central part of the study is an analysis of the deeply collaborative 
ways in which architectural design is organized in the current context. The 
architect, it is shown, must be able to balance the interests of multiple actors 
in complex processes of negotiation. Perhaps a passage from Forester can 
offer a characterization of the complexities Cuff intends:
Designing takes place in institutional settings where rational-
ity is precarious at best, conflict abounds, and relations of power 
shape what is feasible, desirable and, at times, even imaginable. By 
recognizing design practices as conversational processes of mak-
ing sense together, designers can become alert to the social dimen-
sions of design processes, including organizational, institutional, 
and political economic influences that they will face—necessarily, 
if also unhappily at times—in everyday practice. (1989, pp. 120-121)
In line with this account, Cuff argues that the enduring image of the lone 
designer is a myth, and potentially damaging to the education of architects; 
as an individualistic bias characterizes much of the organization of archi-
tectural education, students may be insufficiently prepared for the realities 
of the working life. Even though attempts can be made to incorporate 
elements of authentic interdisciplinary interactions, it is safe to say that 
the full complexity depicted by Cuff would be impossible to model in the 
educational practicum. The focus appears to be, as Cuff notes, on design, 
rather than, for instance, negotiation and the complexities of collaboration 
in interdisciplinary project groups. Even if these things remain outside the 
core of architectural education, educators are by no means oblivious to 
them; Cuff observes that “users” tend to appear through instructors and 
critics acting as proxies, enacting versions of what a user would see, think 
or do in response to the suggested architecture. For the purposes of this 
study, rather than suggest a fault by comparison to the ideal reality of user 
interaction, such an observation points to a potentially interesting topic of 
study. How do instructors make relevant the interdisciplinary realities of 
architectural practice, given the relative absence of those realities in train-
ing in comparison to “the real thing”? Study 1 touches upon these issues. 
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A systematic examination of the enacted presence of users or clients in the 
practice of critique, however, remains outside of the scope of this thesis.
 Cuff examines what she describes as the culture of architectural practice. 
Participant observation, ethnography, and interviews form the basic means 
through which the object of study is worked up as a representation of 
this culture. A different and complementary view of architectural work is 
gained by studies making use of recordings of naturally occurring interac-
tions at architectural work-sites. The particular issue of cross-disciplinary 
interaction in architectural work is examined by Hall, Stevens, and Tor-
ralba (2002) in a study of collaborative work on the redesign of a public 
library. In the analyzed case, architects work closely with structural engi-
neers and preservationists on design problems, which brings their differ-
ing perspectives and competences into contact, and at times, conflict. The 
analyses show how discipline-specific forms of perception and action result 
in interactions where it becomes evident that, “participants from different 
disciplines understand and use what might appear to be the same objects 
or concepts in quite different ways” (p. 204).
 Another concern in studies of architectural work has been the products 
and processes of design. Medway (1994; Medway & Clark, 2003) introduces 
the notion of the virtual building. The concept aims to capture how the 
product of design is a hybrid object consisting of plans, drawings, models, 
and arrays of discursive formulations that provide for the logic, motivation, 
and significance of the physical artifacts. This concept in a sense decentres 
the physical built environment, and highlights the representational and in-
scriptional character of architectural work. Regarding the virtual building, 
Medway and Clark remark:
There is no doubt that this imagined building [...] despite be-
ing unreal in a physical sense, is a solid social fact, some-
thing known, often in great detail, to participants, both in-
side and outside the office, in the activities that cause the build-
ing to get conceived, financed, approved and built. (2003, p. 256)
These virtual buildings are seen as material and semiotic objects, which 
are produced “through the performance of innumerable semiotic acts” (p. 
270). The analyses thus emphasize the role of language in design (cf. Flem-
ing, 1997, 1998). These ways of thinking provide part of the incentive for 
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Study 2, which explores how participants treat some of the interrelation-
ships between designed material artifacts (models, plans, drawings) and 
the ways in which those artifacts are formulated in student presentations. 
Iedema, in a study of the planning and design of a hospital, provides another 
apt formulation of the linguistic, conversational, and inscriptional activi-
ties constituting design work: “[A] project gradually moves from temporal 
kinds of meaning-making, such as talk and gesture, towards increasingly 
durable kinds of meaning-making, such as printed reports, designs, and, 
ultimately, buildings” (2001, p. 23).
 This deeply inscriptional and representational character of architectural 
design work, in which projects gradually take shape through an iterative 
process of production and refashioning of inscriptions—what Iedema calls 
resemiotization—has also been a concern within social studies of science. 
With a background in studies of laboratory work, such as the research into 
visualization practices conducted by Lynch (1985), Yaneva (2005) examines 
how architects work with models and other representations, focusing on 
the constant back-and-forth movement between different scales in the 
gradual working up of the project. In a similar fashion as with Medway 
and Iedema, the designed object is said to emerge in and as manipulations 
of, and shifts between, different representational forms:
Resulting from a rhythm with fine undertones of variation and dis-
tance, acceleration and slowing down, it appears as something qua-
si-unreachable and at the same time ever-present in all models and 
states: a multiple, cumulative object visible through all of them 
and in the movements connecting them. (Yaneva, 2005, p. 888) 
A central point is that a project is never solidified and set as one final 
representation, but rather exists in the juxtaposition of different scales 
and renderings, none of which individually constitutes the final version. 
One might add to this that practices of the kind examined in this thesis, 
presentations of proposals, involve a provisional reduction and settling of 
the presented project for purposes of communication. The presentation 
thereby becomes a central designed object in itself. It may therefore be seen 
and assessed for the ways in which it mediates the hybrid virtual building, 
which otherwise exists in and as the cumulative and juxtaposed collec-
tion of models, drawings, histories, motives, and discursively formulated 
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rationales constituting the project as a whole. The presentation event in a 
sense epitomizes the position of architects as designers of representations, 
in contrast to the master-builders or foremen of foremen of Antiquity.
 The details of architectural reasoning have been examined by Murphy 
(2004, 2005), in a set of studies closely affiliated with the approach devel-
oped in this thesis. These studies explore design activities at an architectural 
firm and discuss, among other things, the central phenomenon of imagina-
tion in design. In consonance with Medway’s way of seeing imagination as 
constituted through the “innumerable semiotic acts” of drawing, talking, 
modeling, arguing, and negotiating, this mode of architectural reasoning 
is construed as a material, discursive and public phenomenon. Imagined 
things are not conceived as mental, private, or otherwise characterized by 
theoretically problematic relations to any putatively external world, but as 
constituted wholly within material and social practice:
These objects of thought [...] are not mental images in the traditional 
sense of what constitutes imagination, but rather are built by com-
bining external semiotic media, specifically talk, gestures, and ar-
chitectural drawings, and using the meaningful intersections among 
them to situate imaginary things in social space and make them pub-
licly available for comment and manipulation. (Murphy, 2005, p. 140)
Similarly, when instructors and students in the analyzed materials talk 
about properties of buildings, spaces, landscapes, or other things not imme-
diately present, these are made available for comment, either through their 
representation in the physical materials of student proposals, or through 
their being suggested as hypothetical developments of the designs at hand. 
Imaginative practice and hypothetical reasoning can, along these lines, be 
considered to be, at least for the practical purposes of criticism, a public, 
material, and intersubjectively accountable exercise. The discursive, ges-
tural, perceptual, and material elements are demonstrated to be integral 
parts of the specifically architectural modes of reasoning that constitute 
design work (see also Mondada, 2006).
 Imagination is also explored in Büscher’s (2001, 2006) studies of land-
scape architects at work. Büscher observes how, in the performance of 
landscape architecture, “there is a continuous flow of formulations that 
shapes the imaginative vision of new landscapes” (2001, p. 224). Materiality 
is accorded a central role: “a mixture of tools, visualisations, objects, percep-
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tion, embodied action, description, and imagination is a pervasive aspect 
of ongoing action and a tangible feature of [landscape architecture]” (p. 1). 
Thus, material objects of diverse kinds can be seen to “sediment on work 
surfaces and walls in the studio, leaving traces of how ideas developed” 
(ibid.). In her analyses of design work, Büscher furthermore shows that 
such traces are not only external debris of mental processes; rather, the 
development of ideas takes place within these equipmental complexes as, 
again, public, material, and embodied inquiries. 
 This brief review of studies of architectural work provides a sense of 
the goal of architectural education, the target of the learning and instruc-
tion that goes on within the educational institution. It is shown as multi-
faceted, organizationally complex, and characterized by a high degree of 
interconnectedness with actors and institutions outside the confines of 
the architectural profession, but also as based on its own quotidian work 
practices—the manual-and-discursive work of design, the mundane draw-
ing and talking-and-gesturing that make up the shop-floor practice of 
architecture. Critique, it would seem, constitutes a setting in which these 
disciplinary realities may be made visible, mediated through the profes-
sional discernment of instructors and practicing architects recruited from 
working life.
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It was noted that the École des Beaux-Arts is considered the starting point 
of modern-day academic architectural training. The Ecole was also the 
place where the first forms of formalized critiques or juries were held. 
Originally, the studio master presented his students’ projects, and argued 
for their qualities before a board of appointed specialists. Over the course 
of the 20th century, this form of jury event developed, via closed student-
jury critiques, to the public events that today are implemented in schools 
of architecture all over the world (Webster, 2005). This development can be 
said to have gone hand in hand with a change in the intended function of 
the critique; the practice is increasingly seen not only as a way of assessing 
student work, but also as a central instructional practice.
normative studies of critique
As noted in the introduction, the lion’s share of the research done on 
critique is conducted by and for educators within architecture, with the 
overarching goal of improving and evaluating existing practice. In a wide-
ly cited interview and questionnaire study, for instance Anthony (1987) 
explores students’ and teachers’ views of the pedagogical significance of 
critique. It is concluded that alarmingly few of the students report that 
they perceive critique as a productive learning experience. Many students 
experience public criticism of their work as stressful, to a point where 
feedback intended to be formative will “fall on deaf ears” (Blair, 2006, p. 
83). Anthony suggests a number of improvements to the organization of 
critique in order to address the perceived problems. Wilkin (2000) also 
critique and instructional work
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reports an interview study with partly overlapping findings. However, the 
author notes that students and instructors alike do perceive critique as po-
tentially offering an opportunity to learn. Negative attitudes are reported 
to be more pronounced with first-year students compared with later years, 
indicating that students over time become better at or more used to taking 
critique. Redesign and improvement are suggested, especially with regards 
to specifying learning goals and assessment criteria—there is said to be an 
element of unpredictability in critique that makes students unsure of how 
to prepare for, and respond to critique. This observation is made in several 
other studies as well. Frederickson (1990) reports a study based partly on 
video recordings of critique. The author notes a set of problems, things 
that can go wrong in the “lines of communication” between critics and 
students during the sessions, and which thereby counteract the pedagogical 
potential of critique. Jones (1996) makes similar kinds of arguments, and is 
largely critical of the design review as a form of assessment.
 Many of these normative studies place the perceived problems of cri-
tique with the critics—in their ways of acting, their failures to articulate 
their grounds for criticism, or their failing to be properly constructive 
in the feedback they give. Several authors, however, also note the ways 
in which students act in the sessions as co-constitutive of the observed 
problems. Frederickson (1990), for instance, notes that a defensive frame 
of mind and lack of “listening skills” may impede the development of 
productive interactions during the critique. A study of critique in fine arts 
education (Mitchell, 1996) could also be mentioned; this study focuses on 
the ways in which students respond to critique. Among other things, the 
study discusses different approaches students may adopt in responding to 
critique and to questions from tutors. It is argued that students’ reluctance 
to explain and articulate ideas behind the artworks subvert the potential of 
critique to be productive and conducive to learning.
 Although not focused on in this thesis, findings within the project of 
which this thesis is part can shed some additional light on these issues. Ob-
servations suggest that an element of instructional work directed at framing 
the critique goes on in the sessions themselves (Lindwall, Lymer, & Ivars-
son, 2008). In situations where students respond defensively, critics may 
engage in meta-talk about critique, saying things like, “don’t see critique 
in that way,” or otherwise formulate the intended significance of critique. 
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Sometimes, before the reviews of the day start, the teachers responsible for 
the course talk about the practice of critique and how it is viewed from the 
perspective of the school, providing students with suggestions of how they 
may think about the feedback they get. Taking into account Wilkins’ find-
ings that indicate an increased appreciation by students of critique through 
their study years, these tentative analyses suggest that repeated exposure 
to criticism, combined with explicit instruction concerning the nature of 
critique, and how it should be regarded and taken up, may contribute to a 
gradual learning of productive ways of acting at the sessions. It may be that 
students over time “learn to learn” from critique.
critical perspectives
One strand in the normative work on critique is represented by studies tak-
ing an explicitly critical perspective on the practice, where concerns with 
improving educational practice are accompanied with elements of critical 
theory. Such analyses of instructional practice are not confined to studies of 
design; parallel discussions can be found across a wide range of educational 
settings. The epistemic asymmetry inherent in such settings, it seems, lends 
itself well to analysis in terms of inequality. Academic supervision has been 
described in terms of master-slave relations (Grant, 2008), science labs as 
inclining students to “bow to an economic imperative and an ownership 
relation” (Beach, 1999, p. 164; see Lindwall, 2008, for a discussion), and 
evaluations of medical students’ actions by instructors as “techniques of 
control” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 45). In relation to the latter, Macbeth remarks, 
“that novice medical students would be told how to proceed in learning 
their medical practice seems to carry the burden of this analysis of ‘con-
trol’” (2003, p. 254). That is, the very notion of an educational situation 
seems to ensure the analytical availability of inequality, subordination, and 
the exercise of power. The practice of critique in architectural education 
is in a sense particularly amenable to such readings. It contains directive 
judgments and evaluations of students’ work, sometimes phrased in ways 
that can be heard as harsh; the artistic elements of architectural competence 
seem to lend themselves poorly to objective evaluation; the relation be-
tween the verbal practice of criticism and the actual work of architectural 
design is difficult to trace; and students often report stressful emotional 
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experiences in connection with the public examination of their work. Ac-
cordingly, there is a recurrence of studies where critique is characterized 
as a “tribal ritual” (Dannels, 2005), a “ritualized legitimation procedure” 
(Vowles, 2000), or similar constructions, which in a sense strip critique of 
its intuitively apparent function as an instructional practice.
 The critical way of approaching the practice of critique can be further 
exemplified by taking a closer look at a set of studies reported by Webster 
(2005, 2006, 2007), which discuss the pedagogical value of critique and 
propose a set of alternative assessment methods for architectural educa-
tion. As an argument for the need of redesign, a set of critique sessions are 
described as events in which “staff used their power to coerce students into 
reproducing staff-centered constructions of architectural habitus”  (2005, p. 
265). Critique is thus seen in terms of power and domination, rather than 
instruction. Webster does note that the observed critics do not enact the 
position of “hegemonic overlord” all of the time;
The findings suggest that the jury system should be understood as a rich 
and complex ritual that is neither essentially ‘bad’—constraining the 
subjectivities of the students by placing limits on oppositional discourse, 
reflective dialogue and critique—nor essentially ‘good’—enabling stu-
dents to individually and collectively critically reflect on the way real-
ity is perceived and understood. Rather, the jury system is a ritual that 
can be used to elicit conformity or to promote freedom. (2006, p. 295)
It is found, however, that the former constraining mode is much more 
common in the observed reviews. In addition, structural features of the 
critique serve to exacerbate the coercive aspects of criticism. Three such 
features can be noted, which are highlighted by the author as particularly 
problematic. First, there is a “staging of power,” in and through the spatial 
arrangement of participants:
[A] distinctive formal spatiality was created through the arrangement of 
chairs. Chairs would be placed in a fanning arch in front of the work of each 
student to be reviewed with the front row of chairs being understood as 
designated for the critics and the rows behind for the student’s peers. This 
directionality and hierarchical assignment of chairs, which one third-year 
student said ‘‘puts you on public display—it’s a scary thing because you are 
so open,’’ clearly spatialized the symbolic power of the critics. (2007, p. 23)
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Second, the choreography of the sessions, in which students speak first, 
followed by critic response, “ascribed the power of ‘judgment’ to the crit-
ics” (ibid.). Furthermore, in often being allowed to sum up the critiques of 
the day, external critics are “given the power to ‘judge’ the currency of the 
atelier’s work within the contemporary discourse of architecture” (ibid.). 
Third, architectural discourse is implicated in the observed coercive prac-
tices; thus, “the symbolic power of the critics was signaled by their ability 
to ‘talk the talk’ and their right to define the words that can be used to 
describe and define architecture” (ibid.).
 On the basis of observations such as these, in conjunction with students’ 
reports about design reviews as stressful events, Webster describes critique 
practice as “a ritualized performance that, through its coercive choreogra-
phy, functions to ensure that students subordinate their own pre-existing 
habitus in favour of assuming the habitus of their tutors” (2005). Rather than 
work as an instructional practice—a characterization reportedly insisted 
on by all the interviewed critics (Webster, 2007)—critique as currently 
enacted has to a large extent become a ritual serving the exercise of power. 
 Webster aims to characterize a setting where individual freedom and 
creativity intersects with established tradition, and with knowledge that 
is owned (cf. Sharrock, 1974) by representatives of an existing discipline. 
A blanket rejection of criticism is not suggested; Webster notes that, “sub-
jects construct and reconstruct their identities within social settings and 
these settings are inevitably both conceptually and materially constraining” 
(2006, p. 295). Rather, it is in the interests of adjusting an empirically ob-
served situation, which is perceived as being askew, that reform is suggested; 
that is, a situation where the directive elements necessary for instructional 
work have in a sense been eclipsed by their coercive, darker, side. The 
theoretical frameworks into which empirical observations are subsumed, 
however, in “stipulating in advance the empirical centrality of matters such 
as power and control” (McHoul & Watson, 1987, p. 284), run the risk of 
inviting a reading in which the coercive elements noted are connected to 
the general idea of critical assessment, rather than some versions of its situ-
ated enactment.
 The analyses also broadly align with what within ethnomethodology has 
been referred to as ironic accounts, in which the analyst imports “a con-
ceptual scheme derived from outside the setting and beyond participants’ 
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conjoint orientation to the setting” (Watson, 2009, p. 63) in order to de-
scribe the setting. Through such a scheme, observed practices “are assessed 
in terms alien to those through which they were produced” (ibid.). In a 
discussion of critical theory, Lynch observes that although the desire for 
a critique of power is warranted and understandable, “the overwhelming 
need to ascend to a more comprehensive, objectively based, and norma-
tively grounded position from which to oppose the powerful forces of 
oppression tends to be realized by turning the field of study into a docile 
projection of a theoretical will” (1993, p. 34).
 In this thesis, the analytic interest instead lies in understanding and ex-
plicating the endogenous rationalities that guide members’ actions. From 
such a vantage point, it appears that critique may be viewed, in the first 
instance, as an instructional practice. Thus, rather than “spatializing the 
symbolic power of the critics,” the physical arrangements of the room and 
the participants can be seen as spatializing the forms of instructional work 
that critique is intended to provide. The critics’ demonstrated competences 
for conversing fluently in architectural language, and their position of au-
thority in relation to practices of formulation, may similarly be understood 
as connected with pedagogy, rather than with simply being able to “talk 
the talk.” And instead of describing the sequential formatting of critique as 
“ascribing the power of ‘judgment’ to the critics,” one could characterize it 
as a spatiotemporal solution, which allows architectural judgment—without 
quotation marks—to work on the totality of the presented proposal. The 
presentation-critique format makes possible for instance the assessment of 
the verbal presentation; the assessment of the relation between stated in-
tentions and the design proposal; and furnishes the necessary clarifications 
and formulations of the proposal that the images on the posters alone may 
fail to convey. The next section will further discuss critique as a form of 
instruction, drawing from studies that have analyzed the details of interac-
tion in different learning settings.
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critique as instructional work
The ethnomethodological perspective sketched above suggests that the 
instructional work of critique, as a form of practical reasoning, must be 
seen as built from perceptual, embodied, material, as well as discursive facets 
of action. First, a few notes on discourse is in order. There is a substantive 
number of studies which focus the ways in which participation in design 
reviews requires mastery of specific genres of architectural language (e.g. 
Dannels, 2005; Dannels & Martin, 2008). The emphasis is on language as 
a tool for presentation, often treated as distinct from design competence. 
Swales et al. (2001) note the importance of metaphorical commentary in 
presenting designs, and suggest exercises whereby students are to practise in 
formulating descriptions of their finished proposals. Morton and O’Brien 
(2005) similarly focus on the verbal element of critique, and explore and 
contrast two different pedagogical models through which students might 
become better at “selling” their work.
 Although sympathetic to these concerns, this thesis does not topicalize 
the language of the critique primarily as tied to the presentation and selling 
event. Rather, I consider the ways in which language may be conceived as a 
central component of specifically architectural modes of reasoning, which 
are by no means confined to the critique setting. The perspective devel-
oped by Medway, as already sketched, provides one entry point to such a 
way of thinking. Fleming (1998) takes a similar approach, in an analysis of 
talk in graphical design critiques. He notes how language has a number of 
functions in design work which, rather than simply communicate designs, 
seem to constitute them; language, it is argued, “functions to suggest, estab-
lish, modify, and regulate material objects” (p. 45).
 Conceptual and linguistic aspects of creative work are also present in 
Phillabaum’s (2004) studies of critique in photography education. A set 
of recurrent repertoires of speaking, or speech genres, is identified, which 
have a bearing on the materials analyzed in this thesis. First, students and 
instructors talk about photographs as formal objects, according to technical 
specifications (hue, saturation, contrast, composition etc.). Second, partici-
pants talk about photographs as ideas, articulating the artistic and intellec-
tual meaning of the print, either in terms of students’ intentions, or as the 
values read into the prints by instructors and peers. Language then enters as 
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an important component of the practices by means of which photography 
is taught, learned, and exercised; language, Phillabaum argues, is “central to 
how apprentice photographers calibrate a professional vision toward the 
objects and environments that are consequential to that profession” (2005, 
p. 148).
 In a related way, Schön (1983) describes architectural design critiques, 
and design work itself, as shot through with linguistic formulations of 
choices, rationales, and expressed intentions, suggesting the notion of reflec-
tion to account for this phenomenon. These empirical findings are used to 
build a general theory of professional competence, whose coherence and 
underlying assumptions have been the topic of criticism by a number of 
authors (e.g. recently by Erlandson & Beach, 2008). For the purposes of 
this study, however, it will only be noted that Schön’s empirical work shows 
an intricate relation between design language, the practice of drawing or 
designing, and the objects thus produced. 
 Embodiment and gesture is somewhat backgrounded in the work on 
critique practice, despite the ample demonstrations of its centrality for the 
accomplishment of interaction (see e.g. Goodwin, 2007a; Kendon, 1997; 
McNeill, 1992; Streeck, 2009), and also for teaching and learning (Roth, 
2001). A few exceptions exist. As we have seen, Murphy (2004, 2005) has 
explored the use of gesture in architectural design work. LeBaron (1998), 
working within a tradition informed by ethnomethodology, analyses the 
use of gesture by students and tutors in a design studio. Similar to Murphy’s 
findings from professional architectural work, gesture is seen as a central 
resource for the accomplishment of architectural conversation, or “build-
ing communication.” Thereby, gesture also forms an integral part of “the 
formation and distribution of knowledge” (LeBaron & Streeck, 2000, p. 
119) in architectural communities of practice. Problematizing the “disem-
bodied” notion of reflective practice that Schön proposes as a way of ac-
counting for design thinking, Blackford Mewburn (2009) argues for seeing 
gesture and embodiment as a way around Schön’s emphasis on linguistic 
articulation in instructional work. In a study focusing on university design 
and craft students presenting their works-in-progress to teachers and peers, 
Hindmarsh & Heath (2003) note the constitutive status of gesture and em-
bodied manipulations of designed objects for the unfolding of the activity. 
When students present their works in progress, “a sense of the object as part 
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of an envisioned whole is achieved only when the gestures over, around 
and with [it] are analysed as they are produced and encountered—in real-
time sequential order” (p. 49). One central lesson learned from gesture 
studies is that taking adequate account of embodied registers of action and 
interaction is important for understanding the work of critique. While the 
analysis of gesture will not be a focal concern in this thesis, a number of 
analytical and methodological consequences can be drawn from research 
that more explicitly focuses on gesture and embodiment. Issues of method 
are detailed in the next chapter.
 There is a growing number of studies conducted in settings outside de-
sign education and critique, which can inform the present work. Goodwin, 
for instance, has explored interaction between newcomers and experts in 
various professional settings, analyzing the detailed actions through which 
disciplinary phenomena are articulated and made visible—feedback, cor-
rections, and instructions, as these actions are performed within temporally 
unfolding and materially situated activities. More recently, this interest has 
been characterized as one of elucidating “the interactive organization of 
apprenticeship” (2007b). In these analyses, the joint perceptual inspec-
tion of material objects is seen as a central component of instructional 
sequences. In the seminal work on professional vision (Goodwin, 1994), 
the interaction between experienced archaeologists and newcomers to the 
setting is analyzed in close detail. Through a video-based analysis grounded 
in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, the study explicates the 
practical work of giving and following instructions in the highly special-
ized modes of perception and action that characterize the archaeological 
field excavation site. In a similar fashion, the production of a certain type 
of fiber in a chemistry laboratory is seen as organized through practices 
where participants jointly attend to the details of the chemical process and 
assess, as well as instruct the assessment of, its developing status (Goodwin, 
1997). 
 Stevens and Hall (1998) make similar observations of the work of en-
gineers, and the development of “disciplined perception” of architectural 
drawings. Focused interaction, in which participants articulate the local in-
teractional and professional significance of objects, and engage in instruc-
tional work as to what may be seen in and through them, can be regarded 
as a central activity for teaching and learning disciplinary reasoning and 
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action. Similar arguments have been made in relation to studies of several 
settings; analyses of interaction in school science (Lindwall & Lymer, 2008), 
photography (Phillabaum, 2005), and control room work, (Hindmarsh & 
Heath, 2000) testify to the recurrence and importance of “object focused 
discussions” (p. 553). In the light of this work, and in conjunction with 
the ethnomethodological perspective developed in the previous chapter, 
critique can be seen as an institutionalized form of installation (Macbeth, 
2000), in which the disciplinary significance of student-produced objects 
is articulated for purposes of instruction. Thereby, it furnishes architectural 
education with a social technology “for the production of competence, 
fluency, and knowing action” (p.23).
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In this chapter, the methodological approach of the thesis will be outlined 
and discussed, focusing on an account of practices of video recording, 
transcription, and analysis. The methodology of the study can be articu-
lated by providing a contrast with dominant methods in the extant body 
of research on design review practice. A common way to proceed in the 
research on critique is to conduct interviews or administer questionnaires. 
As the details and subtleties of interview methodology are far beyond the 
scope of this discussion, only a particular feature of interviewing as prac-
tice will be noted. In an interview study of critique, participants will talk 
about critique, and share their recollections, their experiences—negative 
and positive—and, among other things, offer their analyses and evaluations 
of those experiences in relation to understandings of ideal practice. Thus, 
one significant feature of interviews is that they are built on participants’ 
orientations towards critique as topic, as those orientations occur in con-
versations with the researcher. Something different happens when analyti-
cal attention is turned to the ways in which critique is actually done—how 
participants engage in the work that is glossed by the label. In particular, 
what participants orient to as topic and focus will differ. In examining the 
doing of critique, the analyst finds orientations to various objects (models, 
posters etc.), to co-participants’ actions, and topicalizations of architecture and 
architectural knowledge. Of course, during a session one might find occasional 
(and occasioned) orientations to critique as such, formulations of it as part 
of some course of argumentation or inquiry (cf. Lindwall, et al., 2008, for 
an example). First and foremost, however, participants will be occupied 
methods
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with orders of inquiry that preclude such explicit orientations. In addi-
tion, when such topicalizations occur, they do so as part of some larger 
sequence of activity, and are thereby subsumed under the focal concerns 
of instructional work and architectural reasoning. Thus, what it means to 
study critique becomes a very different thing in research based on partici-
pants’ reports, compared to the approach adopted here. Rather than seek 
access to the use of critique as a category in the self-reflective discourse of 
a community of practice, this thesis examines, to paraphrase Garfinkel and 
Sacks (1970), the work for which critique is, within the setting, a proper 
gloss.
video
Exploring the work of critique is done in this study through analyses of 
video recordings. Lindwall (2008) provides a useful characterization of the 
varied approaches to video research in the learning sciences, and discerns 
three main categories in this field. First, there are studies engaging in cod-
ing, counting, and correlating, an approach that implies the use of “some kind 
of pre-established coding scheme, often involving a system of mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive categories” (p. 37). The recorded interactions are 
transformed into frequency distributions and other descriptions of the 
interrelations of types of actions performed by participants. Second, looking 
through and beyond the interaction involves taking recorded events as indices 
of things conceived as hidden from view. This may be the exercise of power, 
participants’ mental models, understandings, attitudes, or similar phenom-
ena, which become visible only through analysts’ reasoned conjectures or 
through theoretically informed formal analysis. Third, explicating seen but 
unnoticed details, the approach taken here, implies turning one’s analytical 
attention to the rich and visible texture of the work performed in the 
recorded interactions.
 With the latter interest, audio-visual data materials can be said to pro-
vide unique affordances. Macbeth notes: “as a matter of faithfulness to the 
texture, temporal shape and material detail of the scenes they record, the 
video of filmic record provides remarkably uninterpreted renderings of the 
field” (1990, p. 191). This faithfulness makes possible “inferentially minimal 
analyses,” which work exclusively with “the public witnessable detail of the 
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record” (p. 192). The uninterpreted character of video, it should be noted, 
is not an absolute but a relative one. That is, compared to other represen-
tations that may be created by researchers observing naturally occurring 
events, video is relatively well suited to the analytical concerns of explicating 
seen but unnoticed details of practice.
 Researching the work of critique implies turning one’s attention to a 
range of constitutive practical actions whose details participants may be 
only cursorily aware of. The array of tacit social and interactional com-
petences upon which social organization depends, and the complexity of 
practical action, make video a virtually indispensable resource for students 
of naturally occurring activities (Heath & Hindmarsh, 2002, p. 103). It is 
a resource for capturing and making available for repeated scrutiny “just 
those fleeting circumstances that our interpretations of action systemati-
cally rely upon, but which our accounts of action routinely ignore” (Such-
man, 1987, p. 109). Thus, in addition to being oriented towards critique in a 
different way than in the midst of its performance, participants in interviews 
also lack technical access to many facets of the interactive work that may be 
captured and analyzed with video. When analyzing recorded interaction, 
McHoul and Watson notes, one recurrently finds that, “members’ activi-
ties [...] turn out to bear little comparison, in their fine organisation, with 
people’s a priori, typicalised conceptions—whether lay or sociological—of 
those activities” (1987, p. 299). Analyses of recorded interaction, then, have 
a potential for providing a radically different access to critique practice than 
is afforded by elicited recollections.    
recording
Recording was done by me and two other project members (Jonas Ivars-
son and Oskar Lindwall). Apart from a commitment to documenting the 
interactional accomplishment of critique, the interests of the project were 
not set at the time of the recording. The intention was to avoid the use of 
preconceived formulations of what was worthy of inclusion. Our meth-
odological mindset was akin to how Suchman describes her approach in 
Plans and Situated Actions:
The point of departure for the study was that we lack a descrip-
tion of the structure of situated action [...]. The consequence of this 
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commitment to examining the circumstances of action is that we 
need to begin with a record of events which is not pre-judged as to 
its analytic interest either in advance or in the making. (1987, p. 114)
In practice, however, the making of a record of the critique events required 
judgments as to what to include in the frame, when panning, zooming, 
etc., which were irremediably informed by a developing sense of analytical 
interest (cf. Jordan & Henderson, 1995). We made efforts to capture an as 
detailed view as possible of the actions of participants, including gestures 
as well as plans, models, and drawings, while at the same time not exclud-
ing the larger interactive organization or “participant frameworks” of the 
sessions (for further discussion of the practicalities surrounding this issue, 
see Goodwin, 1993). When available, two cameras were used, with one rela-
tively stationary wide-angle view capturing as much as possible, and one 
used to zoom in on the details of gestures and the objects indicated, looked 
at, or otherwise oriented to by participants. In most of the recordings, 
however, only one camera was available. This implied a constant trade-off 
between capturing details and preserving interactive frameworks. For the 
most part the camera could be set to include both student and critic—
normally positioned facing each other but slightly turned out towards the 
audience with the posters under scrutiny in the space between them—
without losing sight of the objects looked at and talked about. It should be 
added at this point that the audience of peers and instructors other than 
those positioned in close proximity to the posters were at best peripher-
ally visible in many recordings. This would—to give just one example of 
the ways in which production values shape what kinds of analyses may be 
subsequently performed with a given material (cf. Hall, 2000)—make a 
study of presenter-audience interaction difficult to carry out in a system-
atic way. Zoomed in shots of posters and models, either with the video 
camera or a separate still image camera were taken at the beginning of each 
session so that details of the proposals could be recovered in case they were 
not sufficiently visible in the video. In some cases, the students’ original 
PDFs could be obtained, which provided additional analytical resources; 
in Study 3, for instance, written material from the posters not readable in 
the recording is used as part of the analysis. At points, however, analytical 
work was hindered, either by a lack of sufficient details of the objects that 
were focal in the interactions, or by an exclusion from view of interactive 
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features such as gaze directions of participants and other facets of embodied 
conduct and comportment. The use of a high definition (HD) camera in 
roughly one third of the sessions proved useful as the higher resolution al-
lowed parts of a relatively wide view to be enlarged so as to, when relevant, 
recover details in plans, models, and drawings. Learning productive ways of 
recording was, in line with Goodwin’s observation, “an iterative progressive 
process” (1993, p. 194), in which camera work and microphone positioning 
were adjusted based on continual reviews and assessments of the material 
captured thus far.
 This account of recording practices highlights the fact that recording 
is itself constituted by domain-specific forms of practical reasoning (cf. 
Livingston, 2008b). The data can also in a sense be said to be theory laden 
(Hall, 2000), in and through researchers’ assumptions about the relevant 
boundaries of the activities of interest, and what aspects of them are to 
be taken into account. The resulting video recordings, then, are far from 
neutral or objective renderings. They are shaped by technologies, analytical 
interests and commitments, and by the many practical decisions made in 
and as the work of recording.
 Recording naturally occurring events introduces the issue of how the 
presence of the camera and the researcher influences participants. Are par-
ticipants adjusting in some way, say as a result of discomfort with being 
recorded; will their normal manners of proceeding change towards enact-
ing officially held ideas of an ideal critique; or will they perhaps alter their 
way of talking to a more formal style than usual (cf. Speer & Hutchby, 
2003)? These are of course difficult questions to answer in general. Partici-
pants who were asked about this in the context of informal conversations 
around the recording stated that they had paid very little attention to the 
presence of cameras and researchers. One critic spontaneously reported 
astonishment at how little he had noted the camera; as the session was un-
derway, he reportedly forgot completely about being recorded. According 
to Jordan and Henderson, “experience shows that people habituate to the 
camera surprisingly quickly [...] In the long run, and in particular as people 
become involved in tasks other than worrying about the camera, camera 
effects visibly wear off ” (1995, p. 56).
 In line with this, our impression was that engaging in the critique 
event—either as student or critic—seemed to require a focused orienta-
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tion towards the business at hand which precluded any sustained efforts to 
adjust to the camera. As to discomfort or nervousness on the part of stu-
dents, it is likely that our gaze, as educational researchers, was experienced 
as less problematic than that of instructors, invited critics, and peers. Out 
of 144 sessions scheduled for recording, only one was canceled when the 
presenting student requested this. Of course, it is unlikely that our pres-
ence did not influence the recorded events at all—just how, however, is 
difficult to assess. Speer and Hutchby (2003) suggest that a resource for 
assessing camera effects may be to apply a video-analytical perspective on 
the issue, examining a set of recordings for the ways in which participants 
visibly orient to the fact of them being recorded. They argue that a sus-
tained, ever-present, influence of recording devices cannot be assumed, but 
should rather be demonstrated according to the same policies that guide 
the analytical work in general, i.e. as demonstrably oriented towards by 
participants. While such a study has not been carried out in a systematic 
way in this thesis, a cursory review of the materials suggest that very few 
apparent disturbances were caught on tape, apart from the occasional quick 
glances and laughter as the external microphone was being re-positioned 
behind the poster screen at the beginning of each new session.
analysis
Analysis in a sense started during recording. This work was in part col-
laborative. Notes of things that struck us as interesting were collated and 
shared during intervals and in between recording sessions. For instance, 
different experiences with recording in critiques where digital slide-show 
technologies were used, as compared to traditional poster-based setups, 
provided the starting point for discussions that were later systematized 
in the analyses reported in Study 4. The relatively active mode of filming 
described above also required a concentrated listening to and looking at 
what participants were saying and doing, something that contributed to 
making the data collection itself functional as a first step in the analytical 
work. The original tapes were digitalized—this process in itself providing 
another opportunity to watch the recordings and re-acquaint oneself with 
the material. Thematic structures for possible analyses, tentative group-
ings of recordings according to some initially discerned commonality or 
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difference, formulations of interesting things, arrays of written notes with 
references to particular episodes or sessions—assemblages of inscriptions 
and formulations perhaps best described as “ideas”—emerged gradually 
through watching the video, transcribing parts for use in data sessions 
and similar events, and in such seemingly peripheral activities as the writ-
ing of various short summaries of the dissertation project intended for 
institutional web-pages and similar fora. Conversations with friends and 
colleagues was another medium through which analysis took shape as 
the gradual solidification, re-assembly, and structuring of talk and inscrip-
tion—images, texts, tables, transcripts—into things which more and more 
resembled academic papers.
 The choice of episodes to focus on in the analyses was made according 
to slightly different logics in the individual studies. In Study 1, an early 
categorization or ordering of observed phenomena—a set of different 
ways of orienting towards the graphical surface of student presentations—
served as the structural basis of the text; episodes were included that were 
deemed to illustrate these orientations in a clear way. In Study 2, various 
circumstances are reviewed in which participants through talk topicalize 
the relation between formulations of intentions and designed objects, with 
a set of perspicuous examples analyzed in closer detail. The logic of selec-
tion is thus to find a collection of instances of a class of actions, defined on 
a discursive basis, on the level of talk. Study 3 focuses on one episode, the 
analysis of which is used as way of respecifying notions of intertextuality. 
Intertextual work is a theme that runs through the whole data material in 
the ways in which students and critics appropriate well-known architects 
and buildings in their presentations and discussions, and so a collection 
could conceivably have been assembled and analyzed. For this topic, how-
ever, a more detailed, in-depth analysis of the treatment by students and 
critics of one single issue worked better than a collection of illustrative in-
stances. Unpacking the disciplinary knowledge indexed by the references 
made to a small set of architects and buildings required extensive space in 
itself, and so including more examples would have involved cutting down 
the detail in the analyses. Study 4 contrasts material set-ups used in the 
critiques, comparing digital slide-show technologies with poster-based 
reviews, and combinations of the two. The different conditions created by 
the technologies are described and discussed with the aim of providing 
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a sense of how critique practice is influenced by changes in mediating 
technologies. Three main dimensions along which the set-ups differ are 
presented, with short excerpts from several different sessions being used to 
explicate the analyses; the basis for selection in Study 4 was the suitability 
of an episode to display critical features of the use of technologies. The 
identification and understanding of these critical differences were based 
as much on an emerging ethnographic sense of recurring features of the 
recorded practices as on the bottom-up analysis of individual fragments.
 The very richness of recordings of interaction makes it plainly visible, 
when textual accounts are placed alongside recordings for comparison, that 
the renditions finally ending up in published reports are at best partial and 
perspectival. The aim is that they should strive to do justice to the origi-
nal recorded events, and the concerns and orientations of participants. As 
McHoul and Watson phrase the matter:
Any re-writing of members’ ways—lay or professional—must always be 
relegated to a state of approximation. Explanation—in the sense of de-
finitive analysis—is unavailable here. Our accounts cannot exactly and 
utterly stand in for the ‘nature’ of things, including the ‘nature’ of other 
accounts. Adequacy, in social scientific as well as everyday account-
ing, is essentially an adequacy-for-practical-purposes. (1987, p. 300)
transcription 
This last section of the chapter is a short note on issues concerning the 
transformation of video-recorded events into textual and graphical dis-
plays suitable for the printed page. Initial transcription was done using 
the software InqScribe. This software had the advantage of preserving the 
connection with the video. Several authors have noted that analyses of 
talk-in-interaction run the risk of losing track of the original events once 
transcripts are produced (e.g. Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998; Jordan & Hend-
erson, 1995; Ochs, 1979; vom Lehn & Heath, 2007). Software that retains a 
close connection between video and transcript is useful for counteracting 
this tendency of what can be referred to as analytical drift. Transcriptions of 
episodes that were considered for inclusion in papers were reworked with 
more attention paid to details such as pause lengths, gestures and embodied 
conduct, with transcription conventions adapted from the standard con-
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versation analytic notation. These detailed renderings often implied seeing 
new things in the episodes, and reconsidering initial impressions of what 
was happening in them. The construction of images to show embodied 
conduct has been an important part of the analytical work, and was instru-
mental in allowing new facets of the transcribed interactions to become 
apparent. Rather than only using dumps from the video, images were “fab-
ricated” for greater clarity and readability. Drawings were made showing 
the shape and outline of gestures. The studies display a number of different 
ways of doing this, and can be seen as different attempts or experiments to 
find suitable ways of presenting the recorded events for the analytical pur-
poses of the individual papers. Just how to proceed in this regard is far from 
self-evident. No standardized mode of representation exists to date, and it 
is doubtful that such standards are even desirable, given the highly domain-
specific nature of embodied conduct, and the varied analytical concerns 
of researchers. As noted by Ivarsson, “it is not without difficulty that the 
temporal and spatial arrangement of bodies, conduct and other events are 
transformed into the fundamentally spatial (non-temporal) arrangement 
better known as ‘a page’” (2010, p. 179). The ways in which embodied 
conduct is represented in the final transcripts vary between and within the 
studies, depending on what point, issue, or phenomenon each analysis at-
tempts to deal with. An approach to transcription and image work, which 
has served as a source of inspiration, can be found in Goodwin (2000).
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demonstrating professional vision
This study provides an initial account of how architectural competences 
are made visible in the sessions. The focus of the analyses lies on visual 
aspects of architectural competence, reflecting both a theoretical interest 
in seeing as social practice and the currency of vision in the discourse of 
the educational setting itself. In the program description for the school of 
architecture at which the study was conducted, prospective students are 
informed, “an important part of your development is to learn to see with 
architect eyes.” This description echoes currently influential approaches 
to the analysis of professional practice, where the idea of an education 
of perception has been explored through the analytical notion of profes-
sional vision (Goodwin, 1994). Two interrelated observations can be made 
on the basis of this body of work: first, that professional ways of seeing are 
inherently bound up with, or attuned to, the specific tools and techniques 
that provide the profession with its enabling “material and cognitive infra-
structure” (p. 626); second, and consequently, objects—graphical displays, 
representations, texts, and tools—whose use and proper perception are in-
accessible to actors outside the discipline abound in architectural practice. 
In professional practice, however, the architect may be required to interact 
with the “discipline-specific forms of perception and action” (Hall, et al., 
2002, p. 204) of non-architects. This tension is addressed in the study as an 
instructional matter.
 The study examines how critics enact a set of visual practices through 
which architectural qualities of proposed buildings become available for 
summary of the studies
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competent scrutiny. Particularly prominent among these practices is the 
seamless fusion of gestural elaborations of architecture’s designed objects 
with the envisaged spaces of a hypothetically perceived built environment. 
The main theme organizing the analyses is a set of discernibly different 
ways in which the graphical surface of the presentation is treated. First, as 
noted, the presentation is oriented towards as a representation that allows 
participants to talk about such entities as buildings, spaces, functions, and 
construction. Secondly, things may be noted as lacking in the presenta-
tion, making critics unsure of how to interpret the intended environment. 
Such problems are also topicalized as an issue of the design process; if the 
critic cannot see the intended structure clearly, then, probably, the student 
were similarly deprived of the relevant resources for judging whether the 
solution works. Third, critics assess the communicative and rhetorical or-
ganization of the presentation. The presentation can thus be seen through to 
afford assessment of a proposed built environment, but it is also looked at 
as a designed object in itself (cf. Suchman, 2000, p. 11). Often, critics alter-
nate between talking about proposed buildings and assessing the designed 
representations of those buildings, and how well they show the spaces they 
represent. Thereby, qualities of the buildings are in some sense construed 
as simultaneously visible and invisible: visible to the critic, but invisible to 
other potential viewers.
 This configuring of perception as an oriented-to feature of the cri-
tique points to an interesting complexity in the status of the architectural 
presentation; it highlights the division of labor in which the architect is 
positioned, and the competent management of possible viewers’ differing 
perceptions of the presentation. Critique practice thus subjects students’ 
work to a variety of substantially different visual practices. The student’s so-
cialization into a specialized field of practice, in which objects are designed 
according to professional rationalities that go beyond what is readily visible 
or accessible to the non-architect, is thereby made accountable for some of 
the communicative demands of professional practice.
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topicalizing intentions, instructing architecture
As can be seen in Study 1, instruction and assessment in critique are over-
whelmingly done through professional readings of the material products 
of students’ work. This study focuses on a particularly interesting variant 
of this practice: assessments of what may provisionally be called the ac-
complishment of stated intentions. For instructors, this quality is not directly 
discernible in the designed object as such. Rather, it is premised on the re-
lation between the object and particular forms of discursive formulations, 
typically occurring in the students’ presentations of their projects. In one 
central episode, a student presents his design of an atelier as an attempt at 
achieving a “heavy” building. In giving feedback on the project, one in-
structor says: “If it’s weight you wanted to achieve you have not succeeded at 
all.” Further elaboration of this comment then ensues, and the implications 
of the assessment are detailed. What is of interest here is the fact that the 
object of criticism is the relation between the student’s stated intentions and 
the qualities that are visible in the presented design, rather than the qualities 
of the designed physical object taken in isolation. 
 Examining this and similar episodes, the study explores the ways in 
which students and instructors topicalize the relation between designed 
artifacts and expressed intentions—the ideas, values, concepts, or thoughts 
that are formulated in rationalizations of students’ designs. One finding is 
that exposed mismatches between stated intention and design provide a fo-
cus for instructional sequences concerned with the ways in which students 
are to coordinate their understandings of concepts with relevant commu-
nities of practice. These sequences involve professional articulations of how 
certain types of formal elements are conventionally seen—certain kinds 
of roofs as communicating lightness, certain combinations of material and 
structure as signaling structural transparency.
 A conclusion drawn from this is that design and intention are treated as 
an inseparable pair. One could say that the formulated intention and the 
designed object are intimately and irremediably tied to each other. The 
project as a whole involves a material-persistent aspect, and a linguistic-
transient one. None of these exists independently, and the meaning of each 
is co-constituted by a reflexive relation to the other. In sum, a proposal as a 
disciplinary object is oriented towards not as a stand-alone material artifact, 
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but as a hybrid between the physical materials of models and drawings, and 
the conceptual formulations that those materials are treated as realizations 
of.
 Topicalizations of intentions often become ways of talking about and 
instructing design processes. Architectural reasoning is tied to the iterative 
nature of design: the designer must continually see and assess the ways in 
which design decisions—for example additions or alterations of parts—
influence the perception of the whole, but without the luxury of having 
the final product at hand. There is a practical problem of gestalt perception in 
design, to which particular forms of seeing and reasoning are oriented. The 
architect is in effect engaged in the creation of gestalts, rather than merely 
their passive perception. The work of critique, in particular where the 
relation between formulations of intentions and the physical designs are 
topicalized, can be seen as instructing these practices of gestalt perception-
and-design; the critics highlight, for instance, where certain details, such 
as bricks and pillars or the color of facades, disrupt the perception of the 
intended gestalt, and give advice to students about some practical ways of 
ensuring reliable continual assessment of how the design will be seen. 
intertextuality and interpretation in the 
education of architects           
Architecture as a discipline is deeply rooted in history—both the history of 
architecture itself and the larger context of unfolding sociopolitical events. 
Architectural proposals are consistently seen in terms of the discipline’s un-
derstandings of extant schools, eras, traditions, events, and previous works. 
Phrased differently, an architectural proposal is in a fundamental sense an 
intertextually oriented and situated object.
 This study examines the ways in which critique may constitute an op-
portunity to raise questions concerning intertextual connections and so-
cio-historical embeddedness: are the students able to place their particular 
solutions within a disciplinary geography of predecessors, contemporaries, 
and traditions? A stock of knowledge of existing works of architecture—
designs having currency in architectural discourse, as masterpieces or fail-
ures, as typical of an era, or as otherwise iconic—is actualized and made 
relevant both in students’ presentations and in the critics’ responses. While 
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lectures and readings can present students with architectural history in 
recounted form, achieving the relevancy of the historical situatedness of 
a student’s design requires the active use of disciplinary perception, inter-
pretation, and articulation.
 This study provides an analysis of one episode from a design review. 
In the episode, an instructor discusses a student project that has incor-
porated the design language of Günther Domenig’s addition to Albert 
Speer’s Congress Hall in Nürnberg. Referring to Domenig, the students 
present a design concept, in which the redesign and addition to the parish 
house will take the form of “cutting in and adding.” They claim that they 
thereby create an “exciting” expression, whilst simultaneously being, as one 
of them formulates it, “respectful to the old building.” The question raised 
by the critic is whether this is a relevant understanding of what they have 
achieved. The instructor points out that Domenig’s design was explicitly 
formulated as an attempt at disrupting and deconstructing the original 
structure, as well the ideologies connected with it. She then argues that 
this metaphorical baggage interferes with the perception of the students’ 
project and with the qualities of their design. In doing this, she raises several 
central issues of interpretation, reception, intention, and historicity.
 In the analyses, issues of intertextuality and interpretation are shown as a 
participant’s concern and as a matter of instruction. The reflexive orienta-
tion to interpretation and intertextual connections that is evident in the 
analyzed interactions is related in an interesting way to the professional 
practice of intertextual analysis. The participants orient to the presence of 
lay and professional analysts out there as a practical concern, relevant for the 
ways in which the critics are to assess student designs and, by implication, 
for how design is to be performed so as to take into account interpretative 
practice. It is treated as a matter of fact that people will interpret and ana-
lyze one’s work. This, in turn, necessitates a concern with “what signals you 
send out.” This points to the conclusion that “interpretation” is included 
in the realm of empirical circumstances and considerations for which the 
work of design is accountable. Interpretation is in a sense placed among 
factors such as structural integrity, aesthetics, and coherence, as part of the 
problem space in which architectural work navigates. Design anticipates 
professional interpretation, and is thus prospectively oriented towards the 
retrospective ascription of intertextual relations, and the meanings they 
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suggest. This requires the designer to be reflexively aware of the politically 
charged meanings communicated by particular expressions, constructions 
and design solutions. 
contrasting the use of tools for presentation and 
critique
Architects design built environments, but the products of their work are 
not in the first instance buildings. Rather, they produce proposals, which 
need to be communicated and then realized through the coordinated work 
practices of numerous other actors. This implies that presentations of pro-
posals are pivotal to the work that eventually culminates in a built envi-
ronment. Presentations have strong persuasive and rhetorical elements; in 
order to convince an audience that a particular design proposal is the best 
solution, the merits of the project are highlighted. Presentation practice 
also has an instructive character; the communication of a proposal to an 
audience of different professionals needs to be instrumental in providing a 
shared understanding of the project, sufficient for subsequent collaborative 
work. Technologies mediating presentations in architecture must, thus, be 
geared not only toward the rhetoric of presentation, but also to the require-
ments of ensuing discussion and assessment.
 This study explores how presentations and discussions of designs may 
be seen as contingent on the specific tools employed in the critique event. 
At the time of the study, three different setups were utilized at the studied 
school: traditional posters, digital slide-show technologies, and combina-
tions of the two. This range of different setups provides a set of contrasts 
that makes visible the role of technologies in shaping the ways in which 
the reviews are conducted. The analysis is structured in three themes. First, 
the sequential organization of digital presentations is examined in relation 
to the spatial structure of poster-based presentations. Second, the different 
ways in which shared attention is established in digital, paper-based, and 
hybrid presentation practices are analyzed. Third, part-whole relations are 
adressed—how details in presented materials are put in relation to the over-
arching project or the presentation as a whole. Taken together, the analyses 
suggest that the detailed organization of the design review is transformed 
in subtle yet consequential ways through the introduction of digital slide-
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show technologies. These transformations might be consequential not 
only locally, for the design review itself, but also for the instructive work 
that is accomplished through this practice.
 The study is concluded with a discussion of some implications for de-
sign. It is argued that an increased awareness of how communicative phe-
nomena are co-determined by the setups might be key for the proper 
adaptation of presentation technologies to the particular demands of cri-
tique and assessment in design education. While the presentation does not 
need to take into account the visibility and accessibility of materials after 
they have been delivered, the critique phase of the design review works 
on the presented object in a very different way. Aspects of the design are 
topicalized in opportunistic ways not immediately related to the logic of 
the authored presentation, and different parts may, therefore, be juxtaposed 
in order to articulate structural features of the design or the coherence of 
the proposal—phenomena not necessarily visible or accessible in any in-
dividual slide. As different presentation setups create different affordances 
for unpacking and elaborating the materials scrutinized during review, the 
ways in which architectural knowledge is exercised, communicated, taught, 
and learned in these situations are transformed along with technological 
change.
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In this thesis, an ethnomethodological analytical approach is applied to 
the study of instructional work within architecture. Of the many different 
and intersecting activities making up the educational program, the analyses 
focus on critique. Although the design review is enduring, widely in use, 
and much debated, very few studies have examined and made visible how 
it is done, in detail, with attention to the real-time verbal and embodied 
actions that constitute its achievement by participants. It may be possible 
to come to some form of understanding of architectural education by 
examining formal learning goals, detailing the content of the courses and 
practices making up the educational program, and eliciting accounts and 
recollections from participants. The practices through which this content is 
realized, however, and through which architectural knowledge is displayed 
and put to work, require forms of research that allow the detailed analysis 
of practice. The research reported here is an attempt to open up the work 
of critique for such analytic scrutiny. 
 The individual studies explore phenomena pertaining to vision, intention, 
intertextuality, and materiality. The first three of these glosses denote features 
and varieties of architectural reasoning made visible as matters of instruc-
tion in the work of students and instructors. The fourth one concerns the 
technological and spatial forms in which critique is realized and which 
shape the reasoning enacted within it. This constellation of topics in no 
way provides an exhaustive account of the instructional practices studied. 
In a situation where the production and presentation of student proposals 
meet professional orders of practical reasoning and judgment, the opportu-
nities are numerous for thematizing diverse facets of architectural practice: 
discussion
chapter 7
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participants engage in instructional work concerning aesthetics, construc-
tion, economic considerations, city planning, demographics, design proc-
ess, argumentation and many other design domains. Each critique session 
provides an open range of possible topics and courses of inquiry. A defining 
characteristic of critique is that the relevant context of a discussion easily 
can be shifted during the course of a single question, comment, or assess-
ment (cf. Jurow, et al., 2008)—say from aesthetical aspects of the design, to 
functionality, construction or some other issue. These aspects, moreover, do 
not occur as decontextualized subjects, but are rather made relevant in rela-
tion to the specific qualities or problems that are seeable in the individual 
projects. Although introducing an element of uncertainty, which may be 
stressful for students, the openness of critique could also be considered 
one of its defining strengths; critique is a situation which prepares students 
for situations of presentation and argument where the ranges of possible 
questions and issues that may be raised cannot be defined, delimited, or 
predicted beforehand. That is, the openness of the design review is not only 
connected to its function as an educational activity, but is a direct reflection 
of the complexity of the profession.
 When looking at recordings of critique it is often difficult to single out 
what issue a given sequence is dealing with. Although a question may be 
raised about some particular aspect of a design, multiple interrelated archi-
tectural problems tend to be actualized in the course of its treatment. Thus, 
any highlighting of, for instance, visual or linguistic features of a design 
works in the setting as a provisional point of entry to orders of practical 
reasoning that go beyond a concern with narrowly defined topics. Topi-
calizations of student intentions, for instance, provide perspicuous settings 
for explorations, by participants, of eminently practical, material, and per-
ceptual issues. The instructional sequences touched off by such references 
come to encompass phenomena ranging from gestalt perception to issues 
of design process and intersubjective architectural grammars. In Study 2, a 
student presents his design for an atelier building, stressing his intention to 
impart “heavy” qualities to the building. In the critique, a number of issues 
is raised. What kinds of structures, forms, and materials are conventionally 
seen as heavy? What gives the impression of lightness? What is the signifi-
cance of a failure to realize a stated intention? What measures can be taken 
to avoid such failures? These are questions dealt with during a stretch of 
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few minutes of interaction, starting in a noted discrepancy between what 
the student says, and what is seeable in the presented design in the eyes of 
the accomplished architect.
 In Study 3, participants topicalize a number of issues clustered around 
the practice of referring in architecture. The ways in which a group of stu-
dents align their design with well-known traditions and architects, and 
incorporate forms and design approaches into their project, are scrutinized 
and discussed by critics and students. It is highlighted that the political 
charge of the cited buildings, and the established meaning of those build-
ings within the architectural discipline, come to influence the ways in 
which the student project may be perceived. This intertextual theme how-
ever, which would seem to pertain principally to the level of architectural 
discourse, is no less gestural, visual, and material in the ways in which its 
relevance is achieved than is the problem of placing and representing the 
infrastructure of ventilation systems (see Study 4). 
 This character of the work of critique—the ways in which topics and 
themes raised for discussion are intertwined with each other, and insepa-
rable from the verbal and embodied conduct of participants—also has 
consequences for the analyst, who attempts to explicate the interactions, 
and the architectural reasoning exhibited in them. Regardless of what topic 
is configured as the focus of an analysis, the latter will irremediably have 
to deal with the complexity of the public fields of action in which partici-
pants operate. For instance, when critique is viewed from the perspective 
of vision, as in Study 1, it is clear that such an entry point in no way affords 
a demarcation of narrowly “perceptual” objects of study. The disciplined 
perception of participants is embodied, material, and relies on a range of 
discursive resources; it is thus recalcitrant to any “opticist” treatment (cf. 
Lynch, 1991, p. 59). As a student of practical action, one must irremedi-
ably come to terms with “the interrelationships between skill, reasoning, 
perception and embodied action” (Livingston, 2008b, p. 9).  
instruction and inscription
In the historical background sketched in the introduction, it is argued that 
the gradual distancing of architectural design from direct involvement in 
the concerns of the building site implied an increased focus on represen-
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tational practice. Indeed, in the work of critique, one finds an unceasing 
orientation to plans, models, drawings, and other renderings constituting 
the architectural proposal. Thus, critique is a setting in which this particu-
lar sociohistorically developed character of the architectural profession is 
highlighted, in and as a set of practices for presentation and assessment of 
assemblages of graphical and three-dimensional renderings.
 Looking at the analyzed materials from this representational vantage 
point, a number of observations can be made in relation to the practices 
through which students of architecture are instructed. First, one may note 
how the proposal emerges as the proximal accountable object of architec-
tural critique, rather than built environments as such. That is, although 
a professional architect may at some point be made accountable for the 
qualities of the environments resulting from realizing his or her designs, 
none of these qualities are directly accessible at the point in time where the 
most consequential judgments about the quality of the design are made. 
And for students learning to design, the former kind of feedback is never 
available; their training is situated within a space of discourse, representa-
tion, and inscription.
 This could be contrasted with other creative disciplines, where respon-
sive practices can be directed at instances of finished disciplinary objects, 
without their representational function becoming similarly relevant. In 
criticism of poetry, for instance, “the intentional fallacy” may be rejected 
in favor of an objectivist analysis (Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1946/1992). For an 
art instructor it is possible to respond to students’ paintings or sculptures 
as self-contained objects. And prints produced in the education of pho-
tographers can be critiqued without a bipartition of assessments directed 
either at a proximal or a distal artifact (Phillabaum, 2005). In architecture, 
the physical object is treated as a rendering of something else. Thus, assess-
ment, instruction, and professional vision alternate between scrutinizing 
this something else, an envisaged built environment assessed for its qualities 
as an inhabited space, and the designed object constituting the presentation. 
To borrow a formulation from Suchman’s analysis of engineering practice, 
the critic “moves fluidly between pictures and things and across time, as 
the artifacts and objects of her work are read through each other to achieve 
a rendition that aligns what is there now with its desired transformation” 
(2000, p. 12).
79
 As a proposal, the accountable object in architectural design education 
is irremediably inseparable from the ways in which it is formulated in lan-
guage. Proposing something is a communicative act, and so the presenta-
tion event requires that the architectural rationality of the design is made 
evident in the fit between seeable and palpable designed artifacts on the 
one hand, and certain articulated values on the other. In presenting, the stu-
dent makes available the ways in which the design achieves its goals, in and 
as the production of orderly features of verbal and graphical texts. Motives, 
intentions, and concepts become relevant features of instructional work in 
the situated practices constituting the design review. The proposal is thus 
not treated as a distinct stand-alone thing. The ways in which participants 
analyze it is not objectivist. Instead, inquiries are directed at a reasoned 
object, with its displayed and ascribed reasons and reasoning treated as ir-
reducibly co-constitutive of its significance and quality.
 The representational and persuasive character of architectural reasoning 
can further be seen in the ways in which the relevance of different catego-
ries of envisaged viewers emerges as a central concern for the participants 
in critique. Envisaged interpretation of the proposed buildings, as well as 
of the graphical renderings of those buildings, becomes an integral part 
of design review practice. In Study 3, the differential modes of access that 
categories of viewers may have to the inferences inherent in intertextual 
references are highlighted as a thoroughly practical matter; such seemingly 
peripheral factors, and the skilled treatment of them, may be as conse-
quential for the success of the project as the integrity and strength of the 
would-be building.
 Study 4 demonstrates yet another consequence of this deeply represen-
tational character of architectural design, as it surfaces in the instructional 
practice of critique. The technologies and setups which are used to medi-
ate the presentation and discussion of design proposals come to shape the 
critique in evident ways. Gestural registers of action, for instance, and the 
ways in which they are implicated in the delivery of criticism, are employed 
differently in the examination of a digital projection than they are when 
conventional posters and models are used. The material form of the cri-
tique has consequences for the forms of reasoning enacted and exhibited, 
and thus for the instructional work accomplished.  
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the instructional work of critique
As Shulman (2005) observes, educational programs directed at the profes-
sions are characterized by their distinctive signature pedagogies. Investiga-
tion of these pedagogies may allow a researcher access to focal concerns 
and practices of academic disciplines and their professional contexts of 
application. In architectural education, the entire curriculum is organized 
around the production, discussion, and assessment of objects. Assessment 
practices feature both as an ongoing element of the processual work of 
producing designs, and—with the critiques—as a final “verdict” on the 
project as a whole. One consequence of this organization is that students 
must begin straight away to do the things they are supposed to learn how 
to do. This characteristic has been described by Schön (1987) as a paradox, 
a version of the general paradox of teaching and learning formulated by 
Plato in the dialogue Meno. Students are being charged with the task of 
designing before knowing what design is. How are they, then, to begin their 
search for relevant ways of designing, and how are they to know when they 
have found them? Students’ learning “bears a double burden: they must 
learn both to execute design performances and to recognize their compe-
tent execution” (p. 88-89).
 In a sense, problems of this kind are managed as a practical matter in any 
educational setting. Rather than an insoluble paradox, then, the phenom-
enon could be considered a “normal, natural trouble” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 
191) of practices of learning-and-instruction. Although a natural trouble of 
this kind is essentially unavoidable—meaning, that anyone who attempts 
a remedy “will quickly encounter interesting properties of these trou-
bles” (ibid.)—solutions for all practical purposes are in no way intractable. 
For instance, as a practical affair of classroom teaching, Meno’s paradox is 
managed by building tasks and activities so that their accomplishment is 
grounded in everyday interactional competences—that is, in things stu-
dents can already do. These are competences for recognizing, for example, 
the tendentiousness of a question, and for finding what answers it may call 
for in the material and social arrangements to which it is fitted (Macbeth, 
2000). In architectural education, a similar solution is at work:
The architectural studio rests on an implicit response to the para-
dox and predicament of learning to design: the student must be-
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gin to design before she knows what she is doing, so that the 
studio master’s demonstrations and descriptions can take on 
meanings useful to her further designing. (Schön, 1987, p. 99)
Iterative cycles of production and response are key to this solution; in-
structions for and descriptions of design, that initially may only be vaguely 
grasped, gradually acquire a more definite sense when they can be jux-
taposed with the objects one produces, and seen in terms of the contin-
gencies of production. The standardized form of the material objects that 
students produce provides a structure that can be picked up and at least 
approximated even with very little training in the discipline. These struc-
tured actions, made visible and crystallized in objects, can then be seen and 
assessed by more experienced practitioners. They form the concrete ma-
terials that make discipline-specific response possible. To take an example from 
Study 1, one critic notes a discrepancy between what is visible in a section, 
and what appears in the plan. On the one hand, one could say that it is a 
simple beginners mistake not to include all relevant details in the section, 
and that such principles may most easily be communicated through texts 
or lectures. The precise highlighting of such details, on the other hand, and 
the detailing of their consequences for the perception of the particular 
design at hand, would have been difficult to achieve without a practice 
premised on a kind of premature performance. A performance, moreover, 
whose products are subjected to maturely professional assessment practices. 
As Säljö describes the particular instructional situation of the critique:
By talking about, and in some sense through, a concrete object, 
the professional experiences and perspectives of the mentor are an-
chored in a shared reality. Judgements may be passed on and com-
ments given, and these derive their meaning from the presence of a 
piece of work that the student is accountable for in terms of its ar-
chitectural qualities. This, to some extent, decentres the student and 
what is in his or her head, and focuses the artefact as a product of 
deliberation and of exercising of judgement that can be discussed 
on the basis of architecturally relevant distinctions. (2009, p. 320)
As we have seen, criticism implies exhibiting architectural judgment, in-
strumental for what Dewey thought of as a processual “reëducation of per-
ception.” In the interactive organization of apprenticeship represented by 
the design review, assessments, corrections and feedback serve to simulta-
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neously shape embodied practices, instruct the usage of categorical distinc-
tions, and inform perceptual inquiries constituted through complexes of 
inscriptions and actions (cf. Goodwin, 1994). Although such instructional 
work is delivered in the critique as a form of assessment, it simultaneously 
exhibits orders of judgment and practical reasoning operative within the 
process of design itself. It is precisely judgments of the qualities of the de-
signed object as-of-now, be it with regard to aesthetic values, functionality, 
structural integrity, or success in realizing an envisaged conceptual gestalt, 
which informs the revisions made at each subsequent iteration. Assessment 
as exercised in the critique is thus not a form of judgment external to the 
competences that go into the production of the objects assessed. Rather, 
the practical reasoning exhibited in critical assessment lies at the very core 
of skilled design work. Phrased otherwise, critique is not only an educa-
tional practice, but also, and centrally, an architectural one.
 In the ways in which diverse disciplinary phenomena and their modes 
of competent treatment are made visible, critique can be said to serve, to 
paraphrase Livingston, as a tangible, concrete, material interface, through 
which reasoning in the architectural domain is “cultivated, exhibited, and 
taught” (2008a, p. 860). The design review is, for analysts and participants 
alike, a perspicuous setting, or a material disclosure, in and through which 
participants may “find, examine, elucidate, learn of, show, and teach” (Gar-
finkel & Wieder, 1992, p. 184) certain orders of architectural reasoning. It 
is in these ways one may understand the instructional work of critique. 
Critique is a site where architectural proposals are treated for the purposes 
of instruction as provisional and improvable, not yet quite set, and where 
their significances are detailed in exhibitions of architectural reasoning 
and judgment. Such exhibiting may involve identifying and elaborating on 
problems or qualities, or articulating values that are architecturally seeable 
in the envisaged buildings and their graphical representations. These inter-
pretations may be juxtaposed with the expressed intentions of students, as 
these appear in verbal presentations or in textual accounts; their interrela-
tions are inspected and discrepancies are noted and discussed.
 Critique features as one component of an educational program con-
sisting of many interrelated and intersecting practices, all playing some 
part in the reproduction of architectural knowledge, and the shaping of 
architects to-be. The function of critique within such processes can be said 
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to centre on the juxtaposition of student-produced objects with profes-
sional competences for seeing, articulating, assessing, and contextualiz-
ing these objects. In organizing the educational program around cycles of 
production and critique, architecture is provided with a powerful means 
through which design competences, and the assessment practices that lie 
at their core, can be made massively present within, and constitutive of, the 
developmental processes through which students, over time, acquire the 
intellectual, aesthetic, and discursive repertoires necessary for competent 
architectural work.
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